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WHY AGENCIES PUNISH

MAX MINZNER*
ABSTRACT
In addition to promulgating regulations, federal administrative
agencies penalize entities that violate their rules. In 2010 alone, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration imposed a statutory maximum $16.4 million penalty on Toyota, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission recovered $535 million from Goldman
Sachs, the largest civil penalty a financial services firm has ever
paid. The academic literature proposes two major theories explaining why agencies might seek these monetary penalties. First, agencies might seek to deter misconduct by using civil penalties to raise
the expected cost of regulatory violations above the cost of compliance. Alternatively, agencies might use civil penalties as one step in
an escalating series of enforcement responses to recalcitrant behavior
by a regulated entity. Both of these theories assume that agencies
punish in order to induce compliance with agency regulations. In the
language of the criminal law, agencies are assumed to be consequentialists. Agency descriptions of their penalty policies support
this assumption. Agencies claim to focus on deterrence, not retribution, when setting penalties.
This Article argues that consequentialist theories fail to explain
the actual civil penalty policies in place at a range of federal administrative agencies. Instead, agency penalty policies are largely
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designed to achieve retributive ends. In short, agencies are more
interested in desert than deterrence. The presence of widespread
retribution in agency punishment raises serious concerns about
legitimacy and competence. Administrative agency punishment lacks
the transparency and structural protections that legitimize retribution in the criminal context. Additionally, agency subject matter
expertise is unlikely to extend far enough to implement retributive
theories effectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies, the fourth branch of government,
famously blend the functions of the other three.1 Agencies write
rules, adjudicate their meanings, and penalize violations. Scholars
commonly assume that agencies have a straightforward goal when
they punish: agencies penalize to induce compliance with their
rules. Penalties aim to curb violations and prevent their reoccurrence. In the language of the criminal law, agencies are seen as
consequentialists. Through their penalties, agencies seek to achieve
positive social outcomes. For example, penalties might deter
misconduct by raising the expected cost of violations above the cost
of compliance, or might attempt to reinforce norms of compliance
through punishment.
Criminal law, of course, also recognizes a second primary aim of
punishment: retribution. The goal of retributivism is punishment
itself—wrongdoers are punished because they deserve it, not to
achieve some broader social end. Indeed, recent empirical work
demonstrates that, for most people, retribution is the primary concern in their punishment decisions. For example, mock jurors are
highly motivated by factors related to retribution, such as mens rea,
rather than those related to deterrence, such as the probability of
detection.2 In contrast, administrative agencies are generally assumed to be different from mock jurors in that they do not impose
punishment based on the desert of the violator. Such retributive
sanctions are usually reserved for more traditional criminal proceedings.
This Article is an attempt to test this assumption. I analyze
agency punishments to determine why administrative agencies
impose civil money penalties, with a particular focus on the penalty
policies of four federal agencies: the Mine Safety and Health
1. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“[Administrative agencies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which
has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension
unsettles our three-dimensional thinking. Courts have differed in assigning a place to these
seemingly necessary bodies in our constitutional system.”).
2. See infra Part I.B.
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Administration (mine worker safety), the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (economic sanctions enforcement), the Federal
Communications Commission (affordable access to electronic communications), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (nuclear
material safety). The central claim is that although administrative
agencies talk about deterrence when imposing civil penalties, the
actual factors that agencies emphasize in calculating penalties
suggest that retribution is an important and, in most cases, the
dominant motivation. I argue that agency retribution raises serious
concerns from both theoretical and practical standpoints. There is
substantial reason to doubt whether administrative agencies are
capable and legitimate retributive entities.
Part I describes the scholarly assumption of consequentialism in
agency civil penalties and compares this assumption to experimental results reflecting a desire for retributivism in test subjects.
These studies on “empirical desert” suggest relatively consistent
retributive desires among the general public. These results should
raise questions about the assumption that agencies are not retributivists. The remainder of Part I considers the penalty policies of
the four agencies that serve as the central case studies for this
Article. Consistent with the consequentialist assumption, all four
agencies reject retribution as a stated goal of their punishment
policies, and all four agencies claim that deterrence is a central
focus of their approach to civil penalties.
Part II tests the four agencies’ claims. By looking at the relative
emphasis on various components of an agency policy on civil penalties, we can determine whether the agency’s goals are deterrence,
retribution, or something else. Theories of optimal deterrence would
place harm or risk at the center of a penalty regime, along with the
probability of detection. Such theories would be relatively unconcerned with mens rea, recidivism, and entity size. In turn, theories
of complete deterrence would emphasize gain and the probability of
detection, with perhaps some consideration of mens rea and a prior
history of violations. The actual penalty policies in place at all four
agencies bear little resemblance to these theoretical approaches.
Consistent with the studies on empirical desert, all four agencies
emphasize the role of mens rea and harm, or risk of harm, in
setting penalties, with some attention for recidivist behavior but
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little or no concern for gain or the probability of detection. Like
most people, administrative agencies emphasize the goal of desert
over deterrence.
Part III considers the normative implications of this conclusion.
If administrative agencies are truly retributivists, does it matter?
I identify two central problems with agency retribution. First,
agencies lack the characteristics of legitimate retributive entities.
Transparency is a prerequisite to desert-oriented punishment, and
agency penalties arrive cloaked in the language of deterrence.
Legitimate retributive entities do not talk about consequentialism
while delivering retribution. Agency punishment also lacks the
procedural protections that provide legitimacy to criminal retribution. Because agency punishments are labeled “civil,” they escape
the procedural limitations that restrict, but also validate, retribution for traditional criminal punishments. Second, agencies are unlikely to be capable of delivering retributive punishment effectively.
An agency might have substantial subject matter expertise in mine
safety or export regulation, but that expertise is unlikely to transfer
to the central task of retribution: distinguishing those violators who
deserve more punishment from those deserving less.
I. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND CIVIL PENALTIES
Administrative agencies lack the inherent power to impose civil
penalties. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies can
only impose sanctions when authorized by Congress.3 Congress,
though, has granted that authority to agencies quite freely.4
Agencies routinely use civil penalties to enforce requirements in
areas as diverse as workplace safety,5 protection of the Antarctic
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2006) (“A sanction may not be imposed ... except within
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103,
111 (1978).
4. As early as 1979, Colin Diver claimed that it was “almost inconceivable that Congress
would authorize a major administrative regulatory program without empowering the
enforcing agency to impose civil monetary penalties as a sanction.” Colin S. Diver, The
Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (1979).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (authorizing the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) to impose civil penalties for workplace safety violations).
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wilderness,6 and export controls to foreign powers.7 This Part
examines both the academic literature on the goals of agency punishment and the reasons agencies themselves have articulated for
imposing civil penalties. In theory, civil penalties can serve multiple
purposes, including deterrence, retribution, reimbursement of
government expenses, and disgorgement.8
Section A outlines the consequentialist assumption underlying
the two dominant theories of agency punishment. The theoretical
literature assumes that agencies impose penalties in order to obtain
compliance rather than to exact retribution. In contrast, Section B
describes the recent scholarly literature on empirical desert. There
is strong reason to believe that most people, when asked to punish,
are primarily interested in retribution rather than deterrence.
Given these results, we should be hesitant to assume that agencies
are different. Section C describes the civil penalty policies of four
administrative agencies, explaining why they serve as appropriate
case studies of agency punishment in action and providing an
opportunity to test the consequentialist assumption. Finally,
Section D examines stated agency policies on civil penalties.
Agencies allege they impose penalties for nonretributive reasons
and seek to obtain compliance, rather than punishment, in their
enforcement regimes.
A. The Consequentialist Assumption: Why Academics Think
Agencies Punish
The academic literature on agency use of civil penalties divides
into two broad categories, both of which assume that penalties are
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 2407 (2006) (authorizing the Director of the National Science
Foundation to impose penalties for introducing waste into Antarctica).
7. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2006) (authorizing the Department of the Treasury to enforce
export control restrictions with civil penalties).
8. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186
(2000) (“To the extent that [civil penalties] encourage defendants to discontinue current
violations and deter them from committing future ones, they afford redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of ongoing unlawful
conduct.”); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (emphasizing the need for a
relationship between the government’s costs and the penalty), overruled by Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (discussing
retribution and deterrence as goals of civil penalties).
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not retributive.9 The first model rests purely on theories of economic
deterrence. Regulated entities are assumed to be rational, wealthmaximizing actors that comply with costly rules if, and only if, the
expected penalty for violations is greater than the costs of compliance.10 Civil penalties are the mechanism the government uses to
impose the sufficient costs.11 Violations will occur when the gain
(g) from the violation exceeds the expected civil penalty.12 The
government then faces the problem of determining the appropriate
fine (f) to achieve the desired level of deterrence.
One option is a cost internalization model.13 The government can
require wrongdoers to pay for the harm (h) they cause.14 Because
most violations occur in an environment where some misconduct
goes undetected,15 the violator will offend depending on three
factors: the probability of detection of the offense (p), the gain from
the violation, and the fine that will be imposed. Specifically, violations occur if g > pf and the gain exceeds the expected punishment. Assuming a fixed probability of detection, the government
then sets f = h/p.16 This model is commonly referred to as an
optimal deterrence approach because, rather than deter all violations, the government only seeks to prevent misconduct when the
net social benefit from the violation exceeds the net social costs.
9. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 20 (1992)
(describing the two models).
10. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
453 & n.9, 454 (2003) (collecting sources); David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational
Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 917, 919-20 (2001) (describing this approach as the “foundation” of environmental
enforcement).
11. See Malloy, supra note 10, at 454.
12. See Spence, supra note 10, at 920-21 (illustrating the calculation regulated entities
use when deciding whether to comply with a law).
13. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 243 (2009) (describing optimal deterrence
as cost internalization).
14. See id.
15. In an environment where enforcement is certain, the government can simply set the
fine equal to the harm. As a result, potential violators will violate if and only if their gain
exceeds the harm.
16. This basic formula setting fines equal to the harm as enhanced by the reciprocal of
the probability of detection has its origins in the writings of Jeremy Bentham but traces its
modern development to Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 190-93 (1968).

2012]

WHY AGENCIES PUNISH

861

Some violations will still occur when the gain from the violation
outweighs the harm.17
Instead of an optimal deterrence model, an agency might instead
take a complete deterrence approach and attempt to prevent all
violations, even if the conduct produces a net benefit.18 Penalties
are designed to strip away gains rather than internalize costs and
are set at a level of f = g/p so that, in expectation, the violator is
punished at a level equal to his benefit from the violation. Because
the expected punishment resulting from the violation exceeds the
benefit to the wrongdoer, the conduct does not occur and deterrence
is complete.19
The primary alternative model to this economic framework builds
on the work of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite20 and emphasizes
that regulated entities frequently have goals that diverge from pure
economic rationality. Corporate actors may be motivated by money,
by social responsibility, by both goals in some combination, or by
neither goal.21 Different motivations call for different regulatory
responses. Ayres and Braithwaite endorse a model of escalating
enforcement—regulators are encouraged to start initially with
gentle persuasion to allow well-motivated actors to identify themselves, advance to warning letters and penalties if persuasion

17. This model also assumes that punishment is imposed only after the undesired harm
occurs. Of course, conduct is often punished based on the risk imposed in advance rather
than waiting until the harm occurs after the fact. Risk regulation fits easily into this model
as well with the harm resulting from the violation being replaced by the expected harm, that
is, the probability of the harm occurring multiplied by the harm that would take place if it
occurred. Cf. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357 (1984) (discussing the social desirability of liability compared to regulation).
18. See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1
REV. L. & ECON. 175, 177-78 (2005); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195-96, 1205 (1985).
19. For analyses of complete and optimal deterrence under various assumptions, compare
Hylton, supra note 18, at 177-78, and Posner, supra note 18, at 1195-96, 1205 (arguing for
complete deterrence in the context of market-avoiding behavior), with A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the
Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 428 (1994) (noting general superiority of internalization
based on error costs).
20. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH
OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 139 (1985).
21. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 27.
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proves ineffective, and finish with license suspension or revocation.22
Under this framework, civil monetary penalties represent an
intermediate sanction residing in the middle of the range of options
that administrative agencies possess to penalize regulated entities,
somewhere above warning letters and below criminal sanctions.
They allow regulators to tailor the regulatory response on a case-bycase basis. They serve the classic law-and-economics goal of increasing costs for those actors who are rationally motivated, but
they are unnecessary for entities that have more virtuous motives
and are insufficient for actors that are either irrational or beyond
deterrence.23
B. Intuitive Retributivism: Why People Punish
The approaches outlined above assume that agencies are
consequentialists. The alternative theory is that administrative
agencies might be retributivists. Agencies might impose punishment to the extent that they believe the violator deserves it, not to
achieve some broader social end. If agencies are actually seeking to
achieve retribution, they have a lot of company. It would mean that
administrative agencies look a lot like the rest of us. A substantial
literature has developed examining penalties in experimental contexts. This research, outlined in more detail in Part II below,
22. Id. at 35-36. Such an escalating “regulatory pyramid” of enforcement draws on the
game-theoretic literature outlining a “tit for tat” strategy as the optimal solution to a
repeated-play prisoner’s dilemma game. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 175-76 (1984).
23. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 53. The availability of civil penalties also
can serve other consequentialist goals. For example, they might improve the credibility of
potentially more significant sanctions, see id., and serve an expressive function by
communicating what standards are particularly important. See generally Tracey Meares et
al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1199-1204 (2004). Such an
expressive function may help entities internalize the notion that the rules are fair and
reinforce the possibility of social disapproval if they violate the law. See TOM TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-5 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006); Malloy, supra note 10, at 454-55
(collecting sources); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 468-71 (1997). Less desirably, civil penalties might also serve an antiexpressive
effect, undermining the norms that are already in place by setting a price for unlawful
conduct. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14
(2000). The expressive role of punishment is discussed further infra Part III.
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suggests that when asked to punish, people do not engage in the
deterrence calculus but instead act as “intuitive retributivists.”24 A
series of experimental studies have found that intuitive assignments of punishment focus on facts that are relevant from a
retributive framework rather than a consequentialist perspective.25
For instance, experimental subjects vary punishment based on
factors relevant to a retributive calculation, such as the severity of
the offense and the mental state of the violator, rather than factors
that are relevant to theories of deterrence, such as the probability
that the violation will be detected and the publicity surrounding the
penalty that will be imposed.26 These results hold even though test
subjects identified deterrence as an important reason for punishment.27 In short, people talk like consequentialists but act like
retributivists.

24. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2086 (1998); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167 (2002).
25. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (2007) (collecting studies).
26. See Kevin Carlsmith, John Monahan & Alison Evans, The Function of Punishment
in the “Civil” Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437, 445 (2007);
Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 444-46 (2002) [hereinafter Carlsmith, The Role of
Retribution] (finding that test subjects seek out information relevant to desert rather than
deterrence); Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish?
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
284, 295 (2002) [hereinafter Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish?] (finding test subjects
largely indifferent to variations in detection probability and publicity of offense); John M.
Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 24 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) [hereinafter Darley et al.,
Incapacitation] (finding test subjects motivated by severity of the offense but largely
indifferent to the need for incapacitating an offender).
27. See Kevin Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words
and Actions, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 119, 135 (2007) [hereinafter Carlsmith, On Justifying
Punishment] (“When a person is asked for a justification of punishment, they respond with
some combination of motives that almost always include retribution and deterrence.
Behaviorally, however, they consistently operate according to principles of retributive
justice.”); see also Carlsmith, The Role of Retribution, supra note 26, at 439; Carlsmith et al.,
Why Do We Punish?, supra note 26, at 295 (“[A]lthough people value deterrence and
deservingness almost equally as motives, they seem to sentence at the individual level from
a strictly deservingness-based stance.”); Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, “I Am
Moral but You Are Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law, 32
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 375, 400-01 (2002).
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These results on intuitive retributivism should give us pause
when assuming consequentialist goals for administrative agencies.
Although agencies have substantial control over their penalty
policies, Congress ultimately oversees their conduct. Members of
Congress are unlikely to emphasize deterrence if their constituents
are interested in retribution. Notably, when Congress has taken
action with respect to agency civil penalty calculations, it has
pushed agencies in directions consistent with this retribution
literature. For example, research suggests that lay jurors, like
agencies, place significant weight on the size of the organization to
be punished.28 In 1995, Congress passed the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,29 which required federal
agencies that regulated small businesses to establish a policy to
provide for the reduction or waiver of civil penalties when a small
entity violated a statutory or regulatory requirement.30 If Congress
implicitly expected retribution in penalty determinations, it would
hardly be surprising that it would get its wish.
Similarly, internal politics may be as important as external pressure. Administrative agencies are not monoliths; they are composed
of their employees. There is little reason to believe that administrative agency employees are significantly different from college
students participating in experiments or jurors deciding on punitive
damages. If individuals are primarily motivated by retributive
desires when they are asked to impose punishments, it may be
unrealistic to expect that their behavior changes based on their
employment.
C. Testing the Consequentialist Assumption: The Agencies
How can we tell whether agencies are interested in deterrence or
retribution when they penalize regulated entities? For agencies that
are relatively silent on the process of calculating penalties, it can be
28. See Cass Sunstein et al., supra note 24, at 2105.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
30. Congress not only passed the rule, it enforced it with a Government Accountability
Office (GAO) audit of various agencies. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-280,
REGULATORY REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED AGENCIES’ CIVIL PENALTY RELIEF
POLICIES FOR SMALL ENTITIES (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01280.pdf.
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extremely difficult. For instance, in April 2010, United States
Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced that the National
Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA)
would seek a record civil penalty against Toyota for its failure
to notify the government of a defective pedal.31 NHTSA alleged
that automobile manufacturer learned of the defect as early as
September 2009 but failed to disclose it for months.32 As a result,
the agency sought, and Toyota agreed to pay, the statutory
maximum civil penalty of $16.375 million.33 NHTSA, though,
provided only limited justification as to why this case deserved the
maximum.34 NHTSA not only did not explain how it decided to
assign the statutory maximum penalty in the Toyota case, it has
not provided any system of guidelines explaining how it calculates
civil penalties.
NHTSA is not alone. For example, the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) within the Department of Transportation can and does
impose substantial civil penalties for violations of safety regulations
covering natural gas pipelines.35 Like NHTSA, though, OPS does
not provide a detailed explanation of how it calculates civil
penalties.36 Penalties imposed on an ad hoc basis provide little
31. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Safety Admin., Secretary LaHood Announces DOT Is
Seeking Maximum Civil Penalty for Toyota (Apr. 5, 2010), available at http://www.nhtsa.
gov/PR/DOT-59-10.
32. Id.
33. See Settlement Agreement at 2, Toyota Motor Corp., TQ 10-002, NHTSA (Apr. 19,
2010), available at http://images.thetruthaboutcars.com/2010/04/toyota_0419.pdf. Toyota’s
failure to disclose the defect exposed it to a potential civil penalty of $6,000 per vehicle, 49
C.F.R. § 578.6(a) (2011), and the NHTSA estimated that the defect affected 2.3 million
vehicles, see Settlement Agreement, supra, at 1, producing a theoretical exposure of $13.8
billion. However, the maximum penalty for a “related” series of violations is $16,375,000. See
49 C.F.R. § 578.6(a).
34. NHTSA simply pointed to its statutory obligation under 49 U.S.C. § 30165 to consider
the size of the business of the violator and the gravity of the violation. See Settlement
Agreement, supra note 33, at 11.
35. See Stakeholder Communications: Enforcement, PHMSA, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
comm/reports/enforce/CivilPenalty_opid_0.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (showing
resolution of 446 cases generating $40 million in civil penalties from 2002 and 2011).
36. The Department of Transportation has promulgated regulations enumerating the
factors for OPS to consider in its penalty determinations without providing any mechanism
for OPS to weigh these factors. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 (requiring the administrator of OPS
to consider (a) the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation; (b) the degree of the
respondent’s culpability; (c) the respondent’s history of prior offenses; (d) the respondent’s
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guidance to what agencies are trying to accomplish, making it
difficult to distinguish retribution from deterrence.37
However, although isolated penalties provide limited information, systems of penalties are different. Such systems rank
violations by indicating which facts will lead to greater or lesser
punishment. As discussed further in Part II, theories of retribution
and deterrence emphasize different factors in setting civil penalties.38 As a result, close scrutiny of agency penalty policies reveals
what agencies are trying to accomplish.39
I consider the civil penalty systems of four agencies with missions
spanning the federal administrative state: the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA); the Office of Foreign Assets
ability to pay; (e) any good faith by the respondent in attempting to achieve compliance; (f)
the effect on the respondent’s ability to continue in business; and (g) such other matters as
justice may require). These factors are virtually identical to the factors OPS is required to
consider by statute. See 49 U.S.C. § 60122(b) (2010).
37. Despite this difficulty, an approach of undisclosed or unclear penalties is difficult to
justify in any system focused on deterrence. Optimal and complete deterrence both assume
that the potential penalty is clearly communicated to potential violators. If offenders are
unable to determine the likely consequences of their actions, they cannot correctly calculate
the expected value of their conduct. As a result, even if penalties are set appropriately,
violations may occur based on erroneous estimates by those in the regulated community. See
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2447-48 (1997) (“If people
do not know the law and do not understand the penalties, then it is tough to see how
increasing the penalties will ever make a difference.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing
Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 997-98 (2003) (describing the difficulty of conveying the messages
of deterrence when punishments are uncertain).
38. The claim that retributive theories of punishment make clear assertions about the
ordinal ranking of punishment is contested. Compare Russell L. Christopher, Deterring
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 893 (2002)
(“[R]etributivism can determine neither the ordinal nor the cardinal ranking of crimes and
their concomitant degrees of punishment.”), with Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban,
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1835 (2006). Even
if one generally accepts the argument that, as a normative matter, desert theories are too
vague to serve as a foundation of a system of punishment, civil penalty systems that are
attempting to achieve that goal can be distinguished from systems aimed at deterrence.
39. Other scholars have made similar efforts with respect to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, reaching divergent conclusions. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H.
Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 67-68 (2003) (arguing that just deserts
provides the best explanation); Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The
Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 561 (2003)
(concluding that utilitarianism is the most plausible explanation for the Guidelines’
structure).
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Control (OFAC); the Federal Communications Commission (FCC);
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). As described below
in the remainder of this Section, these agencies have diverse
missions and different approaches to calculating civil penalties.
Despite their differences, the agencies share several qualities that
make them appropriate case studies for agency punishment in
action. First, all four agencies have issued relatively clear policies
outlining their penalty calculations. Because the penalty systems
provide—more or less—specific relationships between the various
inputs to the penalty calculation and the civil penalty eventually
imposed, examining these relationships reveals whether the systems are aimed at retribution or deterrence. Second, each agency
retains dominant, if not exclusive, control over enforcement in
the subject matter areas they oversee, unlike, for example, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where state enforcement
of federal law plays an important role,40 or the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), for whom private civil suits help
ensure compliance with federal law.41 In all four of these agencies,
state regulation plays only a limited role in enforcing the provisions
of the key statutes,42 and private rights of action, if they exist at all,
40. See CLIFFORD RECHTSHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 91 (2003).
41. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action.... [T]he possibility of civil
damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the
proxy requirements.”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American
Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the
U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 203 (2009) (arguing that private
suits play a more important role in ensuring compliance with securities law than SEC
enforcement).
42. The federal government has completely preempted safety regulation in the nuclear
industry, see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (“State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts with
federal law. Rather, the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”), and attempts at state
regulation of the export control restrictions overseen by OFAC would be constitutionally
suspect. See Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006)
(describing the act of state doctrine). FCC regulations broadly preempt wide areas of state
regulation, see, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 716 (1984), and the 1996
Telecommunications Act expanded the FCC’s preemption of state law to limit the ability of
states to create barriers to entry. See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006). Although MSHA leaves open
the option of state regulatory provisions that are stricter than the federal requirements, see
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are relatively inconsequential compared to other regulatory
regimes.43
Finally, these agencies have substantial control over the penalties they impose. In all four agencies, civil penalty litigation proceeds administratively, rather than in a federal district court. If the
final civil penalty determination lies in the hands of a district judge
rather than the agency itself, agency pronouncements on the size of
penalties that will be imposed are less significant. These four
agencies, though, retain the ability to shape civil penalties to serve
whatever policies they desire. As a result, there is more reason to
believe that the announced policies relating to the imposition of
civil penalties reflect the penalties actually imposed in practice.

30 U.S.C. § 955 (2006), the actual implementation of stricter state regulation varies. See
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The State of Utah’s Role in Coal Mine Safety: Federalism
Considerations, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 143, 159 (2009) (discussing state
variation in regulation).
Importantly, states lack the power to enforce the actual requirements of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act) itself. See id. at 154-55; Alison D. Morantz, Mining
Mining Data: Bringing Empirical Analysis To Bear on the Regulation of Safety and Health
in U.S. Mining, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 45, 48 (2008). In this sense, states have a more limited
role in mine safety enforcement than they do in the broader area of occupational safety
enforcement overseen by OSHA, MSHA’s sister agency. States have the power to completely
displace OSHA regulation with a state regime by obtaining federal approval to do so. See 29
U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006).
43. The Mine Act only creates a private right of action in whistleblower cases, not for
violations of safety regulations. See Gunnells v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 754, 757-58
(S.D.W. Va. 1981). Similarly, the primary rules enforced by OFAC, the Trading with the
Enemy Act and the Cuba Assets Control Regulations, do not contain private rights of action.
See Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 365 F. Supp. 2d. 1263, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d, 450
F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). In the FCC context, the Supreme Court has held that “the
Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights.” Scripps Howard Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942). Consistent with this language, although a few provisions of the
Federal Communications Act create private rights of action, most do not. Compare N. Cnty.
Comm. Corp. v. Cal. Catalog & Tech., 594 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding no private
right of action for unreasonable compensation claim), and Chanayil v. Gulati, 169 F.3d 168,
171 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding no private right of action for violations of certain disclosure
requirements), and Lechtner v. Brownyard, 679 F.2d 322, 327 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding no right
of action under “Personal Attack Rule”), with DirectTV v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 124 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding private right of action exists for signal piracy). Finally, under the Price
Anderson Act, the federal government partially insures nuclear reactors against certain tort
damage claims, limiting their importance. Of course, state law remedies may still exist
within these regulatory regimes. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249, 258
(1984) (holding state law remedies not preempted by Atomic Energy Act).
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1. The Mine Safety and Health Administration
Initially establishing its Guidelines in the early 1970s, the Mine
Safety and Health Administration was one of the earliest agencies
to explicitly describe how it would calculate civil penalties.44 Under
the Mine Act, MSHA must consider six statutory factors in setting
civil penalties: the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the
business of the operator charged, the operator’s history of violations, whether the operator was negligent, the gravity of the
violation, the operator’s good faith in coming into compliance, and
the effect of the penalty on the operator’s ability to remain in
business.45 MSHA has established a point system for the first four
of these factors with increasing penalties for higher scores.46 The
final penalty is reduced by 10 percent if the mine operator timely
abates it and can be further reduced if the amount of the fine
threatens the operator’s ability to remain in business.47 The total
number of points then maps onto a scale that assigns a dollar value
for each level.48
2. The Office of Foreign Assets Control
The Office of Foreign Assets Control, a component of the
Department of Treasury, enforces economic sanctions targeted at
selected countries and organizations by prohibiting trade with those
countries and organizations and freezing assets in the United
States belonging to them. OFAC has the authority to impose civil
penalties on individuals and entities that violate its regulations.49
In 2009, OFAC issued a final rule establishing a set of Enforcement
Guidelines delineating how it intended to calculate civil penalties.50
The process starts with an examination of eleven “General
Factors” relating to the violation to determine whether a civil pen44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See Diver, supra note 4, at 1447 (describing the penalty system then in place).
30 U.S.C. § 820(i) (2006).
See 30 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-100.4 (2011).
See id.
See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3.
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 501.701 (2011).
See id. app. A.
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alty is appropriate.51 Once OFAC decides to seek a penalty, the
penalty depends on three factors: whether OFAC views the violation as “egregious,” whether the violation was self-reported, and
the value of the underlying transaction.52 The penalty for selfreported, nonegregious violations is one-half the value of the transaction, whereas an identical violation that was not self-reported is
penalized at an amount for the “applicable schedule,” which produces a penalty that is moderately larger than the value of the
transaction.53 Egregious violations are punished either at the statutory maximum or at half the statutory maximum, depending on
whether they are self-reported.54 In cases in which the violator
cooperates with OFAC but does not receive credit for self-reporting,
the violation can be reduced 25 to 40 percent.55 First-time violators
are also entitled to a 25 percent reduction.56
3. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission can impose civil penalties
for violations of the Atomic Energy Act and related regulations.57
The NRC uses a multistage approach to penalty calculation.58 Base
civil penalties depend on two factors: the severity level of the
violation and the identity of the entity to be penalized.59
Violation Severity Levels are determined on a case-by-case basis,
but the NRC has set out a long list of example violations, broken

51. The enumerated factors are: (A) the willfulness or the recklessness of the violation;
(B) the actual knowledge of the violation; (C) harm to the sanctions program objectives; (D)
the individual characteristics of the violator; (E) the existence of a compliance program; (F)
the target’s remedial response to the violation; (G) cooperation with the investigation; (H)
timing of the violation; (I) other enforcement action; (J) the deterrent effect of the sanction;
and (K) other factors that might be relevant on a case-by-case basis. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. For instance, for transactions between $1,000 and $10,000, the penalty is
$10,000 whereas for transactions between $10,000 and $25,000, the penalty is $25,000. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (2006).
58. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY 16 (2011), http://
pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0934/ML093480037.pdf [hereinafter NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY].
59. Id. at 70.
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down by substantive categories of violation types60 that fall in each
of the four Severity Levels.61 The NRC has explained that risk
determines the Severity Levels. Severity Levels I and II generally
involve violations that “resulted in or could have resulted in serious
[or significant] safety or security consequences.”62 At the low end,
Severity Level IV violations result “in no or relatively inappreciable
potential safety or security consequences.”63
The second consideration in the penalty calculation is the identity
of the program to be penalized, ranging from a high of $140,000 for
power reactors to a low of $7,000 for research reactors, academic
users, medical users, and other small material users.64 These penalties are then modified by the severity level of the violation, with
violations of Severity Level I leading to a base civil penalty amount
of 100 percent of that set for the program of that size, whereas
violations of Level II and III are 80 percent and 50 percent of those
levels, respectively.65
Once the base penalty determination has been made, the NRC
then examines four additional factors in setting the penalty
amount: prior history, credit for identification, credit for corrective
action, and circumstances warranting a discretionary adjustment
to the penalty.66 First, in cases involving a nonwillful Severity Level
III violation, the NRC considers whether there has been a recent
enforcement action against the licensee.67 Next, the Commission
60. See id. at 8. The substantive categories are Reactor Operations; Fuel Cycle
Operations; Materials Operations; Licensed Reactor Operators; Facility Construction;
Emergence Preparedness, Health Physics, Transportation, Inaccurate and Incomplete
Information or Failure to Make a Required Report; Discrimination, Reactor, Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Fuel Facility, and Special Nuclear Material Security,
Materials Security; Information Security; and Fitness for Duty. Id. at 33-64.
61. Id. at 10. Violation Severity Levels range from I (the most serious) to IV (the least
serious), but the NRC has indicated that Level IV violations are not normally subject to civil
penalties. See id. at 70.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 70. The NRC also has a separate penalty for loss, abandonment, or
improper transfer or disposal of material. See id.
65. See id. at 70.
66. See id. at 16-22.
67. See id. at 16. Specifically, the Commission looks to whether this is the first nonwillful
Severity Level III violation within the last two years or two inspections, whichever is longer.
Id.
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considers whether the licensee identified the violation or if it came
to light as a result of Commission action or as a result of a system
event.68 If either the licensee receives credit for identification or the
violation was not willful and no greater than Severity Level III, the
licensee will receive either no penalty or the base penalty, depending on whether there is credit for corrective action.69 If the licensee
does not receive credit for identifying the problem and the violation
was Severity Level I, II, or a willful Severity Level III violation, the
licensee will receive either the base civil penalty or twice the base
penalty, depending on whether there is credit for corrective action.70
Finally, the NRC decides whether there should be a discretionary
adjustment of the penalty.71
4. The Federal Communications Commission
The 1934 Communications Act established the Federal
Communications Commission and charged it with providing nondiscriminatory access to “rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable charges.”72 The FCC imposes two different types of
civil penalties under two slightly different statutory structures.
First, penalties authorized generically by section 503 of the
Communications Act have a statutory maximum.73 For these penalties, base penalties are set for a wide range of potential violations.
For example, the base penalty for transmission of indecent or
obscene materials is set at $7,000, whereas the penalty for exceeding power limits starts at $4,000.74 Second, other statutes authorize
penalties in fixed amounts, which are then subject to mitigation.75
Both types are then subject to adjustment according to factors

68. See id. at 16-17.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 22.
72. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
73. See 47 U.S.C. § 503 (2006). FCC civil penalties are called “forfeitures” as a result of
the language of the governing statute. See id.
74. See 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, 17,113-14 (1997).
75. See id. at 17,117.
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described in the FCC rules.76 Upward adjustment criteria include
egregious misconduct, ability to pay/relative disincentive, whether
the violation was intentional, the presence of substantial harm,
prior violations of FCC requirements, substantial economic gain,
and repeated or continuous violations.77 Downward adjustment
criteria include whether the violation was minor, whether the violation was in good faith or was disclosed voluntarily, a history of
overall compliance, and an inability to pay.78 Although the FCC had
previously provided specific guidance in evaluating these factors,
the current version of the FCC guidelines does not provide weights
for increasing or reducing the base penalty.
D. Why Agencies Say They Punish
Before engaging in a detailed analysis of these penalty policies,
it is worth examining the stated justifications that agencies provide.
All four agencies emphasize consequentialism, rather than retribution, when describing their enforcement approach.79

76. See id.
77. Id. at 17,116. “Relative disincentive” is the phrase the FCC uses to capture the notion
that the same penalty is felt differently by different entities.
78. Id.
79. These agencies are not alone. The SEC, the Department of the Interior, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the EPA all explicitly focus their use of civil
penalties on deterrence, not retribution. See Gordon, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,667 at 40,182 (Mar. 16, 1993); Premex, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,165 at 34,892-93 (Feb. 17, 1988); Department of Interior
Interim Rule Relating to Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
Regulations—Civil Penalties, 62 Fed. Reg. 1820, 1821 (Jan. 13, 1997) (“Civil penalty amounts
will be calculated to ensure compliance and not as retribution.”); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES 1 (1984); James D. Cox & Randell S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 751 (2003) (discussing central role of
deterrence in SEC enforcement). I am aware of one agency that has indicated that it might
consider retribution as a legitimate goal of its civil penalty policy. In 2003, the Federal Trade
Commission issued a policy statement on equitable remedies in competition cases and drew
a distinction between disgorgement and civil penalties based on the differing goals of these
sanctions. “[D]isgorgement is an equitable remedy whose purpose is simply to remove the
unjust gain of the violator. Penalties are intended to punish the violator and reflect a
different, additional calculation of the amount that will serve society’s interest in optimal
deterrence, retribution, and perhaps other interests.” Policy Statement on Monetary
Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820, 45,823 (2003).
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First, both of the primary enforcement documents the NRC has
promulgated emphasize deterrence.80 The NRC Enforcement
Manual specifically disavows retribution as a goal,81 and the NRC
Enforcement Policy82 states that it “endeavors to ... [d]eter noncompliance by emphasizing the importance of compliance with NRC
requirements [and] [e]ncourage prompt identification and prompt
comprehensive correction of violations of NRC requirements.”83
More specifically, the NRC explicitly identifies these goals as the
reason for imposing civil penalties.84
NRC civil penalty cases reinforce these policy statements. In
Atlantic Research Corp., the NRC interpreted its governing statute
to impose a requirement that penalties serve nonretributive ends:
From the standpoint of the imposing authority the penalty is
“remedial” if it aims to improve conduct and is not motivated
solely by a desire to inflict punishment for its own sake, i.e., as
retribution. Whenever the conduct-affecting motive is present,
a civil penalty is “remedial” and there should not be any
semantic limitation on the NRC's power to impose it.85

Subsequent decisions have continued to reject retribution as a
goal.86
Similarly, in rulemakings setting out its civil penalties, MSHA
has always relied heavily on consequentialist rationales for its civil
80. See NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58, at 3 (broadly detailing the NRC
policies on enforcement); NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NRC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL
(2010), http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html#manual
(providing guidance to NRC staff in the implementation of the Enforcement Policy).
81. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 80, at 4-53 to -54 (“The purpose of a civil
penalty is not retributive, but remedial, and should: (1) Encourage licensees to take effective
and lasting corrective actions to avoid future problems by being in compliance; and (2) Create
a deterrent that will prevent future violations, both for the individual licensee and for other,
similar licensees.”).
82. The NRC penalty calculation method is laid out in the NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY,
supra note 58, at 14-22.
83. Id. at 5.
84. See id. at 16-20 (noting the goals of civil penalties as encouraging identification and
correction of violations, achieving deterrence, and focusing licensee attention on significant
violations).
85. 11 N.R.C. 413, 421 (1980).
86. See Tenn. Valley Auth., 60 N.R.C. 160, 216 (2004); Hurley Med. Ctr., 25 N.R.C. 219,
239 (1987); Duke Power, 21 N.R.C. 1759, 1773 & n.9 (1985).
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penalties.87 MSHA has specifically focused on the legislative history
of the Mine Act, which clearly indicates that deterrence represents
one of the central goals of Congress, and has emphasized language
that appears to set out a notion of complete deterrence, instructing
that penalties be set at a level sufficient to strip away the gain from
the violation:
Increasing penalties is consistent with Congress’s intent that
penalties “be of an amount which is sufficient to make it more
economical for an operator to comply with the Act’s requirements than it is to pay the penalties assessed and continue to
operate while not in compliance.”88

In the same rulemaking, MSHA noted related language from the
Supreme Court implicitly assuming that the deterrent value of civil
penalties provides the primary justification for imposing them.89

87. See, e.g., Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed.
Reg. 13,592, 13,593 (Mar. 22, 2007) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“MSHA’s experience shows
that penalties are an important tool in reducing fatalities, injuries, illnesses, and
violations.”); Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 71 Fed.
Reg. 53,054, 53,056 (Sept. 8, 2006) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“The Congress intended
that the imposition of civil penalties would induce mine operators to be proactive in their
approach to mine safety and health, and take necessary action to prevent safety and health
hazards before they occur. In this proposal, the Agency is strengthening the civil penalty
assessment regulations which will be an important tool in the reduction of fatalities and
improvement in miner safety and health.”); Civil Penalties for Violations of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,514, 23,515 (May 30, 1978) (codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 100) (“[W]hile Congress did not want excessive penalties levied against noncoal
operators, it also was concerned that, as a whole, penalties were too low to be an effective
deterrent of unsafe or unhealthful conditions or practices.”).
88. Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. Reg. at
13,593 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 41 (1977)); Sec’y of Labor v. Davis Coal, 2 FMSHRC
619, 625 (1980) (quoting same language); see also Criteria and Procedures for Proposed
Assessment of Civil Penalties, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,055 (“The intended purpose of civil
penalties under the Mine Act is to ‘convince operators to comply with the Act’s
requirements.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 45 (1977))).
89. See Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 13,593 (citing Nat’l Indep. Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 401 (1976)) (“A
major objective of Congress was prevention of accidents and disasters; the deterrence
provided by monetary sanctions is essential to that objective.”).
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Like MSHA and the NRC, the FCC rulemakings outlining its
system of guidelines for calculating civil penalties90 emphasize
deterrence:
We believe that the increases in our forfeiture authority as well
as the accompanying legislative history of our forfeiture
authority support our determination that forfeiture amounts
should be set high enough to serve as a deterrent and foster
compliance with our rules.91

The FCC has included language suggesting it favors a complete
deterrence approach preventing entities from benefiting from violations. For instance, the FCC noted that “we intend to take into
account the subject violator’s ability to pay in determining the
amount of a forfeiture to guarantee that forfeitures issued against
large or highly profitable entities are not considered merely an
affordable cost of doing business.”92
Finally, unlike the other agencies, OFAC has included some
language recognizing retribution as a potential goal of civil penalties. In responding to a comment endorsing a purely retributive
approach to penalties, OFAC noted that punishment has multiple
purposes.93 Like the other agencies, however, OFAC repeatedly
identifies deterrence as the central goal of its civil penalty system
in enforcement of economic sanctions: “Penalties, both civil and
criminal, serve as a deterrent to conduct that undermines or
90. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) (2011). This rulemaking readopted a penalty system
previously promulgated by policy statement and struck down by the D.C. Circuit. See Policy
Statement, Standards for Assessing Forfeitures, 6 FCC Rcd. 4,695 (1991), rev’d U.S. Tel.
Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
91. 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, ¶ 19 (1997); see also id. ¶ 20 (discussing differences in deterrent
impact of penalties on entities of different sizes). The FCC does recognize that a second goal
of penalties is to serve as a “meaningful sanction when violations occur.” Id. ¶ 19. Athough
this could be read as retributive, the agency seemed to be drawing a distinction between
specific and general deterrence. See id. (quoting a House report that identifies the goals as
“a meaningful sanction to the wrongdoers and a deterrent to others”).
92. Id. ¶ 24; see also id. ¶ 31 (“Licensees must strive to comply with rules. [Warning
letters] could invite some licensees to commit first-time violations with impunity.”).
93. See Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,593, 57,599 (Nov.
9, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501) (“OFAC rejects this argument [that OFAC’s
enforcement response should focus solely on the Subject Person’s culpability], as the purpose
of enforcement action includes raising awareness, increasing compliance, and deterring
future violations, and not merely punishment of prior conduct.”).
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prevents ... sanctions programs from achieving their various
goals.”94
II. CIVIL PENALTIES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THEORY AND
PRACTICE
As outlined above, the basic approach to deterrence involves
setting penalties such that the expected value of the fine ensures
that violators either bear the costs they impose or are deprived of
any gains from misconduct.95 These basic models are subject to a
large number of extensions and modifications. The literature on the
law and economics of punishment has often looked at administrative agencies and proposed modifications to their enforcement
regimes to better achieve the goals of deterrence with respect to the
probability of detection,96 the credit for self-reporting and remediation,97 the harm resulting from the violation,98 the costs of
enforcement,99 and the decision not to seek penalties at all.100 In all
94. Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,933, 51,934 (Sept. 8,
2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501); see also Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines,
74 Fed. Reg. 57,593, 57,594 (Nov. 9, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501); 31 C.F.R. § 501 app.
A (2011) (noting the agency will examine the impact of the action “on promoting future
compliance with U.S. economic sanctions” by the same and other entities in setting the final
penalty level).
95. See discussion supra Part I.A.
96. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 742-44 (1997) (examining
environmental audit policies in the context of optimal deterrence); David A. Dana, The
Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 969, 978-92 (1995)
(discussing how the probability of detection factors into corporate decisions of regulatory
compliance along with audit immunity implications); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 569, 594-605 (2006) (arguing for alteration of tax policies to structure penalties to
inherently account for the probability of detection).
97. See Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An
Empirical Assessment of EPA’s Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 418,
426-27 (2004).
98. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 41, at 763 (analyzing the role of investor losses in SEC
enforcement actions).
99. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & David Rosenberg, A New Model of Administrative
Enforcement, 93 VA. L. REV. 1983, 1985 (2007) (discussing improved audit techniques to
achieve equivalent deterrence at equal cost).
100. See P. Fenn & C.G. Veljanovski, A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory
Enforcement, 98 ECON. J. 1055, 1066-68 (1988) (examining decisions not to impose penalties
in the context of workplace health and safety enforcement in the United Kingdom).
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of the extensions, though, the core of the model remains the same.
Penalties are largely shaped by gain, harm or risk of harm, and the
probability that the penalty will be imposed.
This observation is far from novel. Agencies are aware of this
literature and routinely cite it.101 More significantly, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the
independent agency designed to foster improved agency practice,
made a broad recommendation to agencies that they adopt a
complete deterrence approach:
A penalty intended to deter or influence economic behavior
should, at a minimum, be designed to remove the economic
benefit of the illegal activity, taking into account the documented benefit and the likelihood of escaping detection.102

Agencies have often cited to the ACUS recommendations on civil
penalty determinations in setting their specific policies on civil
penalties.103
101. For example, as early as 1986, the Federal Trade Commission commissioned an
academic study of optimal penalty calculation that relied on the academic literature. See
John Nash, Optimal Civil Penalties 30 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 138, 1986),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp138.pdf. In addition, a range of agencies
have cited Gary Becker’s seminal article, Crime and Punishment, supra note 16, and its basic
results about harm and the probability of detection. See, e.g., Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,062 n.88 (Dec. 10,
2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (SEC Final Rule); New Entrant Safety Assurance
Process, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,472, 76,481 n.10 (Dec. 16, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 365, 385,
387, 390) (FMCSA Final Rule). The CFTC perhaps came closest to explicitly adopting a
complete deterrence approach to penalties. See GNP Commodities Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,360 (Aug. 11, 1992) (asserting penalties must strip
away the gain from violations and be enhanced to compensate for undetected violations). But
the agency was reversed on appeal, see Monieson v. CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 864-65 (7th Cir.
1993), and subsequent efforts to adopt an approach based purely on theories of economic
deterrence never achieved a majority vote of the Commissioners. See Staryk, [2003-2004
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 29,826 at 56,456-62 (July 22, 2004) (BrownHruska, Comm’r, concurring in part, dissenting in part); R&W Tech Services, [2003-2004
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 29,556 at 55, 392-96 (Aug. 6, 2003) (same).
102. 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.3 (1995), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/
305793.html. The recommendations of the Administrative Conference were traditionally
published in the CFR, but the practice ceased with the 1995 defunding of ACUS.
103. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,337, 3,370 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt.
726); Compliance and Enforcement Procedures Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
57 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,587 (proposed July 9, 1992) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 575); 6 FCC Rcd.
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Very different concerns shape retributive penalties. Unlike the
forward-looking approach of deterrence, retribution is backwardlooking, focusing on the violator and his conduct. Punishment is
imposed because a wrongdoer deserves it, not to achieve some
broader external goal.104 Retributivism, of course, is not one theory,
but many.105 For my purposes, two primary theories matter. First,
normative theories of desert examine how entities should be
punished.106 Second, theories of empirical desert consider how
individuals impose punishment in experimental contexts.107 From
a normative standpoint, I intend to emphasize aspects of retributivism that, in my view, are widely shared across different
theories: proportionality and moral blameworthiness. Punishment
is acceptable only to the extent that it is proportionate to desert.108
Wrongdoers who deserve more punishment must receive more
punishment, and moral blameworthiness makes one defendant
deserve more punishment than another.109 Additionally, where such
data are available, I will particularly compare civil penalty policies
to the results of the literature relating to empirical desert.
The central argument of this Section is that, proceeding from
these basic frameworks, systems of penalties that are primarily
4,695, 4,695 (1991) (FCC civil penalty policy).
104. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 104 (1997); Lawrence Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, Punishment
and Prevention, 63 MONIST 199, 199-202 (1980); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 700 (2005).
105. How many theories is even a matter of some debate. Compare John Cottingham,
Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979), with Paul H. Robinson, Competing
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
145, 146 (2008).
106. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition
Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1832, 1834
(2007).
107. See id. at 1832, 1834-35.
108. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 104, at 700; Alice Ristroph, How (Not) To Think Like a
Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 738-39 (2009); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the
Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 56 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
109. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203
(2000); Lee, supra note 104, at 710 & n.155; Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of
Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 279 (2005) (“A principle of just deserts can, but need
not, demand proportionality between offense and sanction; what the principle really demands
is a correspondence between desert and sanction.”); Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages,
Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 109, 120 (2008).
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focused on deterrence can be distinguished from systems that
emphasize retribution. In particular, I will look at several factors
that play a role in administrative punishment and try to classify
them according to the theory of punishment they primarily serve.
Foremost among these are the probability the violation will be
detected and punished, the harm or the risk of harm resulting from
the violation, the gain from the misconduct, the history of the entity
committing the violations, the size or wealth of the entity committing the violation, and the mental state of the entity committing the
violation. To a large degree, of course, most of these could matter
for theories of deterrence and retribution. However, different theories of punishment require different emphases in setting penalties,
and the extent to which each of these factors receives attention in
the penalty calculation will help determine which theory of
punishment the system is serving.
A. Harm, Gain, and the Probability of Detection
1. The Theory
The standard economic analysis outlined in Part I above leads to
the straightforward conclusion that in a system of administrative
penalties designed to achieve optimal deterrence, the probability of
detection and the harm from the violation—or in the case of risk
regulation, the expected harm—should lie at the center of the
penalty calculation.110 Other factors may matter, but these two
aspects should dominate. Similarly, in a system of complete deterrence, the gain to the violator and the probability of detection
should be the primary focus in penalty determinations.111 Notably,
the emphasis on these factors is largely exclusive. For an optimal
deterrence model, gain is essentially irrelevant. An optimal deterrence model assumes that some violations should take place and
only those violations in which the costs exceed the benefits should
be deterred.112 As a result, only the harm, not the gain, plays a role
in the penalty determination. Although the size of the offender’s
110. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; supra note 19.
111. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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benefit from the violation will determine whether or not it occurs,
the offender’s benefit does not have an impact on the size of the
penalty. In contrast, in a complete deterrence approach, harm is
largely irrelevant.113 As long as the offender does not benefit, the
harm will not occur.
Moreover, harm and gain should not simply matter abstractly by
merely increasing penalties as harm and gain increase. They need
to be calibrated more precisely to ensure that the offenders do not
earn net benefits or impose net costs. For example, systems of
complete deterrence cannot simply impose a rule of “more punishment for greater gains.” Instead, such systems must try to determine how much the offender benefited by breaking the rule.
In a retributive system, these factors play a different role. As
noted above, detection probability is irrelevant to retribution.114
Desert-oriented punishment gives no reason to incorporate the
likelihood of a punishment into the calculation of its size. Indeed,
normative theories of desert should affirmatively reject including
this probability as a factor in the punishment calculation. Because
the probability of detection is effectively independent of the extent
of a violator’s wrongdoing, altering the punishment on this basis is
very likely to undermine the basic principle of proportionality
underlying retributivist theories.115
The literature on empirical desert reinforces this theoretical
result. Numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that
individuals place little or no importance on the probability that the
defendant’s conduct will be detected and punished. Study participants do not adjust penalty amounts based on the probability of the
misconduct being detected.116 Similarly, when asked about the
appropriateness of considering the probability of detection in the
context of punitive damages and regulatory enforcement, overwhelming majorities of those surveyed rejected the optimal
113. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
115. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 71, 73-74 (1980) (describing this result as “anathema” to retributivists).
116. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 237, 243 (2000). Even when the probability of detection varied from 1 in 100 to 1 in 5
(a factor of 20), there was no statistically significant difference in the penalty imposed by
mock jurors. See id. In fact, although not statistically significant, cases involving a higher
probability of detection produced slightly higher damage awards. See id.
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deterrence approach.117 A 2009 study of both members of the public
at large and Israeli judges found similar results: virtually no
relationship exists between the probability of detection and the
penalties imposed, even though participants expressed a stated
desire to implement a deterrence rationale.118
Whether the outcomes of misconduct—the harm to the public or
the gain to the wrongdoer—should matter for theories of retribution
is sharply debated.119 A well-respected, and arguably dominant,
retributive position is purely intent-based.120 Outcomes do not
matter and only the culpable mental state of the violator should
determine the existence or the amount of punishment.121 To be sure,
the harm wrongfully risked plays a crucial role in determining
culpability.122 Everyone adopting a retributivist position would
agree that intentionally risking more significant harm enhances the
defendant’s culpability compared to conduct that is less risky.123
From the perspective of harm-irrelevant retributivists, however, the
final outcome itself is merely the result of “moral luck,” independent of the culpability itself.124
Although this is a common retributivist position, it is not the
only one. Other retributivists argue that outcomes can matter to
culpability.125 Conduct that risks harm is punishable, but to a lesser
117. See id at 245-46.
118. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, The Role of Probability of Detection in Judgments
of Punishment, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 553, 580-82 (2009). Baron and Ritov found that
individuals do not take probability into account when setting penalties, even though a
substantial number of their survey participants indicated that it was an appropriate
consideration and they were able to induce a minority of those surveyed to consider
probability under certain circumstances. See id. at 580-81. The authors suggest that this
result indicates that jurors may not be disinterested in deterrence but are simply inattentive
to it. See id. at 582.
119. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 472-74 (1978) (asserting that
relevance of actual harm is a “deep, unresolved issue”).
120. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY:
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171 (2009); FLETCHER, supra note 119, at 472; MOORE, supra
note 104, at 193-95 (describing harm irrelevance as the “standard educated view”).
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 104, at 193.
123. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 120, at 47 & n.38.
124. See, e.g., id. at 188-91 (“Bad luck ... cannot affect our culpability.”).
125. See MOORE, supra note 104, at 193; Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral
Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 267 (1994); see also Leo Katz,
Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
791, 792 (2000); Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,
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extent than conduct that leads to an undesirable outcome that
actually occurs.126 Even for these scholars, though, outcomes take
a back seat in culpability determinations.127 From this perspective,
as Michael Moore has noted, actual harm is something of a “poor
relation” because culpability is both necessary and sufficient for
punishment, whereas harm is neither.128
Although the importance of outcomes is an open question in the
philosophical literature, the literature on empirical desert has an
answer. Harm matters for the public at large. Experimental studies
find that, when asked to punish, test subjects are strongly motivated by the outcome of the misconduct.129 Behavior that causes
harm is punished more severely than conduct that does not, and
punishment increases as the magnitude of the harm increases.130
2. The Practice
Consistent with a retributivist approach, the enforcement
probability is entirely absent from the process of calculating penalties for every agency. Similarly, with the limited exceptions
discussed below, gain is largely irrelevant to the penalty determination for all four agencies. All other things being equal, extremely
lucrative and difficult-to-detect rule violations are punished no
more severely than those in which compliance with the rule is
cheap and violations are always punished. Perhaps equally important, no agency tries to quantify gain or harm to ensure that the
penalty is as least as great as the estimated financial benefit from
the violation or an approximation of the harm caused or risked by
the violation. Such a calculation, although difficult, is central to any
deterrence-oriented approach to punishment.131
in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 76 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
126. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 104, at 280-81.
127. See, e.g., id. at 193.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment, supra note 27, at 133-34.
130. See, e.g., id.; Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish?, supra note 26, at 288, 296.
131. I am aware of one agency that does take such an approach to punishment. The EPA
sets penalties in a manner designed to ensure that the penalty is greater than the gain to the
violator from the misconduct by including a “benefit component” in the calculation of the
penalty amount. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 79, at 3-4. Even the EPA, though,
does not enhance the penalty by the probability of detection. See id. at 3-6.
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Although the gain and the probability of detection of the violation
are absent from the penalty determination, harm and the risk of
harm are strongly considered. In the MSHA scheme, the potential
total of eighty-eight penalty points available for “gravity” is the
largest single category considered in the penalty determination.132
The penalties do not, however, appear to move in a manner consistent with a theory of optimal deterrence. As discussed above,133
were MSHA trying to apply notions of optimal deterrence, the risk
of harm should turn on an expected value calculation, increasing
the penalties for gravity linearly in both the probability of the
outcome and the harm. In fact, the probability of the outcome is
extremely important in determining the ultimate penalty, whereas
the severity of the outcome itself is relatively unimportant.134 For
example, the likelihood of occurrence includes five levels of
probability, ranging from no “likelihood of occurrence” to “occurred,”
each reflecting a ten-point increase in the number of penalty points
assigned, producing a total range of zero to fifty.135 In contrast,
severity scores range from only zero to twenty, even though the
lowest category of severity is “no lost work days” whereas the
highest category covers fatal injuries.136
More noticeably, the penalties increase quite slowly as the
number of potential victims increases. For example, a violation that
would affect ten or more victims receives only seventeen more
penalty points than a violation that would affect only one victim.137
In contrast, there is a twenty-point increase in penalty points if the
outcome is “reasonably likely” rather than “unlikely,” reflecting a
one-level increase in the likelihood of occurrence.138 A one-level
increase on a five-level scale can hardly reflect the ten-fold increase
in probability necessary to justify the comparison to the increase in
the number of victims if the agency were trying to engage in a pure
expected loss calculation.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e) (2011).
See supra note 17.
See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e).
Id. § 100.3(e) (tbl. XI).
Id. § 100.3(e) (tbl. XII).
Id. § 100.3(e) (tbl. XIII).
Id. § 100.3(e) (tbl. XI).
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Like MSHA, the NRC heavily emphasizes the role of harm and
risk in setting penalties.139 This emphasis is reflected in the NRC
examples setting the base severity levels. For instance, in the
category of Reactor, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation,
Fuel Facility, and Special Nuclear Material Security, Severity Level
I violations involve the theft, diversion, or sabotage of a significant
quantity of “special nuclear material” (SNM) or certain other
radioactive materials.140 Level II events include the loss, destruction, theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a smaller quantity
of SNM.141 Level III events include an insider attempting an act of
radiological sabotage and various failures of licensees to safeguard
against unauthorized access.142 Severity Level IV violations, finally,
include a failure of a licensee security or insider mitigation program
resulting in an attempted act of radiological sabotage and a loss of
SNM of low strategic significance.143 These Severity Levels increase
as the level of nuclear material involved increases or as an unauthorized person’s access comes closer to causing harm. In that way,
they quite reasonably draw strong distinctions between levels of
conduct posing risk of harm. They bear little or no relation,
however, to the probability of the violation being detected144 or the
benefit the regulated entity derives by saving on the costs of
compliance.
OFAC also places harm at the center of the enforcement
program.145 Setting the penalty based on the value of the underlying

139. The NRC has one category of violations in which the base penalty does relate to gain.
For loss of certain types of material, the base penalties are set at a level to reflect three times
the average cost of disposal of the material. See NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58,
at 70 n.3. This guarantees that entities will not benefit by “misplacing” material rather than
disposing of it properly. However, the presence of this consideration for one type of base
penalty simply highlights its absence elsewhere.
140. SNM includes enriched uranium-235, uranium-233, and plutonium. See 10 C.F.R. §
73.2 (2011) (defining the regulatory term “formula quantity” to mean “strategic special
nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the
formula, grams = (grams of U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium)”).
141. See NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58, at 57.
142. See id. at 57-58.
143. See id. at 58.
144. Indeed, the theft or loss of a greater quantity of material is probably more likely to
be detected than the theft or loss of a smaller quantity.
145. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A (2011) (expressing actual or potential harm to sanctions
program objectives as a factor affecting administrative action).
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transaction can be viewed as an attempt to measure either the
harm or the gain from the transaction, but it is not a perfect
measure of either for every OFAC violation. In the context of OFAC
violations, the harm is best seen as the benefit of the transaction to
the sanctioned party whereas the gain is the profit from violation.146
In cases involving violations of export restrictions, this profit is
certainly less than the face value of the transaction, whereas the
harm could be much greater. For example, in cases involving the
export of military technology that would otherwise be difficult or
impossible to obtain, the harm from the violation is likely to be
much larger than the transaction value. For other violations,
though, the fit between transaction value and harm is much tighter.
For instance, OFAC can freeze assets belonging to target countries
or individuals.147 In cases in which a financial institution releases
frozen funds to a sanctioned entity, the value of those funds is likely
to reflect the harm, at least if the harm is viewed as the value of the
transaction to the sanctioned entity. In contrast, for these violations, the gain to the financial institution committing the violation
may be a small fraction of the value of the transaction, if effectively
nonexistent.
Finally, in setting the base penalty levels, the FCC also emphasizes the potential harm from the violation as the central consideration: “Consistent with our policy of protecting the public and
ensuring the availability of reliable, affordable communications, we
based the guidelines on the degree of harm or potential for harm
that may arise from the violation.”148 Conduct that merely risks
harm is punished less severely than conduct that causes the
undesired outcome.149 For example, actual interference with a
146. OFAC recognizes the connection between transaction value, harm, and benefit. See
id. (noting that in cases where the transaction value is uncertain, it will look at, among other
factors, the economic benefit to the violator and the benefit to the sanctioning party).
147. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2011) (freezing Cuban assets); 31 C.F.R. § 560.201
(2011) (freezing Iranian assets).
148. The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and the Amendment of Section 1.80
of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture Guidelines, 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, ¶ 20 (1997). The
FCC does identify gain in one portion of the penalty process. “Substantial economic gain” is
listed as a criterion for enhancing the civil penalty. Id. app. A. Notably, though, the increase
is not tied to the specific amount of the gain, and the agency does not explicitly indicate that
it is making an effort to ensure that there is no net benefit from the misconduct. See id.
149. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80 (2011).
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signal has a base penalty of $7,000 whereas conduct that merely
risks such interference has a base penalty of $4,000.150
As is true with the other agencies, the FCC appears indifferent
to the probability of detection and punishment. In some ways, the
lack of emphasis on the probability of detection is especially notable
in the FCC context because of the wide range in detectability of
violations the FCC oversees. For example, among other regulatory
requirements, the FCC oversees the transmission of obscene and
indecent materials.151 Such violations, including the infamous
“wardrobe malfunction” at the 2004 Super Bowl,152 are almost
certain to be detected, given that they are by their very nature
broadcast widely. By contrast, the FCC also oversees the enforcement of violations that are likely very difficult to detect, including
restrictions on the transfer of substantial control of stations and
fraud.153 Nothing in the policy statement recognizes the variation
in the differential ability of enforcement authorities to detect and
punish these different types of violations.
B. Mens Rea
1. The Theory
Although harm, gain, and the probability of detection are the
central concerns of theories of deterrence, the mental state of the
wrongdoer with respect to the wrongful conduct dominates the field
for retributivists.154 A more culpable mens rea increases the wrongfulness of the act and, as a result, the amount of punishment that
is deserved. Individuals who knowingly cause harm deserve greater
punishment than those inflicting harm merely recklessly. As
discussed above, the strongest possible retributivist position with
respect to the mental state of the violator is that only culpability
150. See id.
151. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (2011).
152. See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing imposition of civil
penalty for Super Bowl indecency), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009).
153. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(F).
154. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 104, at 192; Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence,
and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 956 (2000) (“The concept of fault, and in particular
the notion of mens rea—the conception of fault as an intentional state on the occasion of
wrongdoing—is an essentially retributivist idea.”).
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should matter and punishment should rest solely on intention
rather than outcome.155
Consistent with this conclusion, experimental results have
repeatedly demonstrated that the mental state behind a violation
plays a key role in punishment determinations.156 For example,
mock jurors punish corporations for engaging in explicit cost-benefit
analyses.157 Such cost-benefit calculation, of course, is inherent in
the classic Learned Hand statement of negligence liability158 and is
also foundational in the notion of optimal deterrence itself. Setting
fines at the level of harm as augmented by the probability of
detection assumes that firms are going to engage in those risk calculations. Jurors, though, appear to strongly dislike such behavior
by defendants.159 Examples of such punishment have been widely
reported in the popular press, most famously in connection with the
Ford Pinto, when Ford was seen as having considered the trade-offs
between risk and safety and deciding that the costs of fixing the
problem were greater than the risk-adjusted benefits of doing so.160
More formally, study data demonstrate that both the likelihood of
punishment and the size of the penalty imposed have increased
significantly when defendants have conducted such risk analyses.161
Although culpability is easy to categorize for retributivists,
deterrence theories have struggled to find an appropriate role for
mens rea to play in the penalty determination.162 As an initial
matter, a cost-internalization approach assumes that violators
might consciously break the rules, because under some circumstances the benefit from the violation might exceed the costs. In
those cases, it makes little sense to enhance punishment for more
culpable mental states.

155. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 120, at 171.
156. See, e.g., Carlsmith, supra note 27, at 133
157. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judgments, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 119-20 (2001).
158. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947).
159. See Viscusi, supra note 157.
160. See id. at 117-18 (discussing the Pinto case).
161. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
556-57 (2001).
162. See Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 895, 898 (2000)
(“On the face of it, the economist has no use for a mental state requirement of any sort.”).
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On the other hand, the calculation is more complicated when the
goal is to deter all violations. I am aware of at least two major
articles arguing in favor of a role for mens rea in the economic
deterrence literature. Richard Posner, noting that the emphasis on
intent in the criminal law is “puzzling to the economist,”163 provides
three arguments in favor of its incorporation. First, a mens rea
requirement might serve as a proxy for calculating the probability
of detection, as more culpable mental states may be correlated with
attempts to conceal the violation.164 Second, he argues that mens
rea can reflect the violator’s responsiveness to punishment.165
Violators with a more culpable mental state may demonstrate punishment insensitivity. Finally, Posner views mens rea as a useful
tool in identifying what he refers to as “pure coercive transfers,”
actions that bypass a functioning market with no redeeming social
benefit.166
In contrast, Professor Jeffrey S. Parker argues that the mens rea
requirement solves a very specific information problem.167 Law
enforcement may have difficulty determining the optimal sanction
based on the level of social harm and the probability of detection,
and as a result, penalties are upwardly biased.168 Additionally,
offenders may not be able to correctly characterize their activity
with respect to the criminal prohibition. The mens rea requirement
permits offenders to not overinvest in precautionary resources.169
To the extent that Parker’s and Posner’s first two claims have
force in the traditional criminal law context, they are far weaker in
the civil administrative context. Posner argues for using mens rea
as a proxy for either sensitivity to punishment or the probability of

163. Posner, supra note 18, at 1221.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. Posner compares car theft with the railroad’s negligent destruction of crops
that happens to start a fire on a nearby farm. The thief and the railroad both bypass the
market, but only the car thief engages in a “pure coercive transfer” because his goal was to
take the automobile, whereas the market bypass as a result of the railroad’s fire was merely
incidental to productive economic activity. See Finkelstein, supra note 162, at 901 (citing
RICHARD A. POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW ch. 6
(1987)).
167. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (1993).
168. See id. at 769.
169. See id. at 773-74.
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detection.170 One persuasive response to Posner’s argument is that
in traditional criminal cases, judges are not instructed to measure
these attributes directly.171 Furthermore, for the civil penalties
considered in this Article, the targets are corporations and the
penalties are measured in dollars. As a result, there is limited
reason to think that violators have unusual sensitivity to punishment. Additionally, administrative agencies have a substantially
greater ability to calculate actual probabilities of detection through
audits. Mens rea should not be necessary as a proxy for this quality.
Similarly, Parker’s argument has limited force here. Administrative agencies regulate a community of entities with greater information than traditional criminal defendants and possess far more
information about those entities than the law enforcement community possesses about those it charges with crimes. Mens rea should
be less necessary for administrative agencies to solve the dual
information problems he identifies.
Posner’s third argument in favor of mens rea has achieved the
most traction.172 The primary criticism of his argument is the
limited scope of the justification.173 It merely separates offenses
that, in the language of the Model Penal Code, are committed
purposefully from those that are committed knowingly. Violations
in which the forbidden object is the conscious object of the wrongdoer are treated differently from those in which it is practically
certain, but not necessarily desired, that the harm will occur.174 As
a descriptive account of the criminal law, this distinction does not
hold up and does not justify a broad use of mens rea across a wide
variety of mental states.
2. The Practice
Consistent with a retributive approach, all four agencies place
culpability at the center of the penalty process. For example, the
structure of the OFAC systems means that the egregiousness
170. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1221
171. See Parker, supra note 167, at 763-64.
172. See id. at 765 (“Posner’s third suggested explanation for mens rea comes closer to the
mark, but still is incomplete.”).
173. See Finkelstein, supra note 162, at 897.
174. See id. at 905; Parker, supra note 167, at 766.
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determination plays an extremely important role in setting penalty
levels for OFAC, especially for relatively small transactions.175
Because the statutory maximum for OFAC civil penalties is the
greater of $250,000 or twice the value of the transaction,176 penalties for egregious violations are always at least twice the penalty
for nonegregious violations that involve a transaction of the same
value. For transactions below $125,000, the increase as a result of
an egregiousness determination is even larger. The considerations
that lead to an egregiousness determination strongly suggest
retribution. OFAC has stated that it will look at the eleven general
factors to determine whether the violation was egregious, but with
particular emphasis on three of them: whether the violation was
willful or reckless, the subject of the investigation’s awareness of
the conduct at issue, and the harm of the conduct to the objectives
of the sanctions program.177 The first two of these, of course, are
focused on the mental state of the violator. In determining the
“willfulness or recklessness” of the violation, OFAC analyzes the
subject’s mental state with respect to the law itself—whether the
subject knew the violation violated the law or demonstrated
reckless disregard with respect to the violation of the law.178 The
agency also considers whether there was prior notice, a pattern of
violations, and management involvement.179 In determining the
awareness of the conduct, OFAC looks to the mental state of the
violator with respect to the conduct, evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of the violation, and management involvement.180
Such a system of enhanced violations, in which penalties increase
dramatically when the violator possesses a highly culpable mental
state and the violation involves substantial harm, strongly suggests
a retributive goal.

175. See Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,833, 51,935 (Sept.
8, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501) (“[I]n recognition of OFAC’s position that the enhanced
maximum civil penalties authorized by the Enhancement Act should be reserved for the most
serious cases, the Guidelines distinguish between egregious and nonegregious civil monetary
penalty cases.”).
176. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2006).
177. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A (2011).
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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Similarly, in the MSHA system, the mens rea of the operator of
the mine plays a very substantial role in the determination of the
final penalty. The increases for a culpable mental state range from
zero to fifty penalty points, the second largest potential increase
available under the MSHA system.181 MSHA not only considers the
mental state of the violator but also draws extremely fine distinctions among various levels of culpability. Violations receive a tenpoint enhancement for “low negligence,” defined as cases in which
“[t]he operator knew or should have known of the violative condition or practice, but there are considerable mitigating circumstances.”182 Those are distinct from cases receiving a twenty-point
enhancement for “moderate negligence,” in which there were
mitigating circumstances that were not “considerable,” and cases in
which there were no mitigating circumstances at all, reflecting
“high negligence” and subject to a thirty-five-point enhancement.183
The largest enhancement, fifty points, is reserved for cases in which
“[t]he operator displayed conduct which exhibits the absence of the
slightest degree of care.”184 Such fine-grained distinctions of culpability would have little role to play in a system of complete or
optimal deterrence.
The mental state of the violator also plays a critical role in the
NRC calculation. The Commission views willful violations with
“particular concern” and states they cannot be tolerated.185 The
focus on mens rea is present in the factors the NRC indicates it will
look at in exercising its discretion to deviate from the civil penalty
calculation.186 Among other reasons for deviating, NRC will enhance
penalties in cases involving “willfulness, particularly instances
where the licensee made a conscious decision to be in noncompliance ... in order to obtain an economic benefit.”187 Additionally,
although the NRC usually does not impose penalties in excess of
$140,000 for any single violation, it reserves the right to exercise its
discretion to impose penalties up to the statutory maximum of
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3 tbls. I-XIII (2011) (illustrating the penalty points).
30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58, at 9.
See id. at 29.
Id.
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$140,000 per violation per day in cases in which “a licensee was
aware of a violation, or ... had a clear opportunity to identify and
correct the violation but failed to do so.”188 The NRC also enhances
penalties when it appears that the licensee made a conscious costbenefit calculation to gain an economic edge as a result of the
violation.189 The NRC focuses on willfulness not only in setting
penalties but also in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion to
seek penalties in the first place. The NRC Enforcement Reports
specifically identify those violations that involve willful misconduct,
and in each year from 2005 to 2009, a substantial fraction of the
cases for which the NRC has sought civil penalties involved willful
violations.190
Finally, the role of the mental state of the violator also appears
in the FCC penalty system.191 Notably, the FCC sets the base penalty for two specific violations at levels that are strikingly high
compared to others and justifies these high base penalties by
focusing on the culpability of the violator. First, the violation that
the Commission chose to punish most severely is misrepresentation/lack of candor to the FCC.192 Alone among the violations, the

188. Id. at 15. The central role of mens rea is also apparent in the NRC’s explanation of
when it will take enforcement actions against individuals. Virtually all of them require
willful misconduct. See id. at 30-31.
189. Id. at 29.
190. See NRC 2009 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 4 (nine of seventeen actions in
Fiscal Year 2009 seeking civil penalties involved willfulness); NRC 2008 ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM ANN. REP. 4 (nine of twenty-eight actions in Fiscal Year 2008 involved willfulness);
NRC 2007 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 2 (six of eighteen actions in Fiscal Year 2007
involved willfulness); NRC 2006 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 2 (four of fifteen actions
in Fiscal Year 2006 involved willfulness); NRC 2005 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 2
(nine of twenty-two actions in Fiscal Year 2005 involved willfulness). The NRC Enforcement
Reports are available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/annualrpts. The NRC justifies breaking out willful violations in its Enforcement Reports by
emphasizing the seriousness with which the Commission treats intentional misconduct:
Information regarding willful violations is identified because such violations are
of particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is
based on licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with
integrity and communicating with candor; therefore, a violation involving
willfulness may be considered more egregious than the underlying violation
taken alone would have been, and the severity level may be increased.
NRC 2009 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 4.
191. See 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, ¶ 27 (1997).
192. See id. app. A. § 1.
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FCC sets that base penalty at the statutory maximum.193 The
penalty is set at such a level because “[r]egardless of the factual
circumstances of each case, misrepresentation to the Commission
always is an egregious violation. Any entity or individual that
engages in this type of behavior should expect to pay the highest
forfeiture applicable.”194 Second, the highest base penalty specifically denominated in dollars is set at $40,000 for unauthorized
conversion of long distance service; aside from misrepresentation
penalties, no other base penalty exceeds $10,000.195 In setting
penalties at this level, the Commission emphasized its history of
treating those violations seriously when “fraud is an issue, or in
cases where the carrier’s deliberate failure to ensure that letters of
authorization are valid and properly authorized rise to the level of
gross negligence.”196 This central focus on culpability is particularly
striking because, at least in theory, it should not be difficult to use
billing records for the new and old carriers, at least to estimate the
gain to a long distance carrier or the loss to the customer from an
unauthorized conversion.
The FCC also demonstrates an interest in culpability in its
adjustment factors. The agency applies an upward adjustment for
“intentional violation[s]” and a downward adjustment for good faith
and voluntary disclosure.197 The FCC abandoned its system of
weighing these factors in 1997 “[t]o reflect more clearly the
Commission’s discretion to increase or reduce a forfeiture penalty
as much as warranted based on the unique facts of each case.”198
Assuming that the FCC, though, did not intend to abandon the
relative importance of these factors, it still may provide guidance on
what the FCC intends to emphasize and distinguish between
retribution and deterrence as potential purposes. Prior to the 1997
revisions, the potential increase for intentional violations was 50 to
90 percent and the potential decrease for good faith and voluntary

193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 21. The Commission then goes on to note that misrepresentation is likely to lead
to revocation of the licensee. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. ¶ 38.
197. Id. app. A. § 2.
198. Id. ¶ 26.
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disclosure was 30 to 90 percent.199 No other enhancements could
alter the penalty by a greater amount.200
C. Prior History
1. The Theory
Should retributivists care about recidivism? Leading retributivist
theorists are divided on this point. George Fletcher, among others,
has argued that prior convictions are irrelevant to offenders’ deserts
and thus are irrelevant to the punishment they deserved.201
Because punishment must remain proportional to wrongdoing and
only to wrongdoing, a history of violations does not affect the
deserved punishment.202 However, to the extent retributive theory
focuses not so much on punishing the violator for the act itself but
instead reflects punishment for the wrongdoer’s bad character, a
history of violations has evidentiary value. Not only can the
punisher draw inferences about character from this violation, but
the history of violations also provides evidence that the inference of
bad character is not mistaken.203 Reducing punishment out of
recognition of the inherent likelihood that anyone could run afoul
of a prohibition brings punishment more in line with the actual
desert of the wrongdoer.204
Of course, as a practical matter, in traditional criminal cases,
enhancements for prior history are commonly justified in terms of
retribution.205 This result finds support in the empirical desert
199. 8 FCC Rcd. 6,125, app. § 2 (1993).
200. Id. Minor violations also could reduce the penalty by 50 to 90 percent, whereas
egregiousness and ability to pay could also increase the penalty by 50 to 90 percent. Id.
201. See FLETCHER, supra note 119, at 466 (“The contemporary pressure to consider prior
convictions in setting the level of the offense and of punishment reflects a theory of social
protection rather than a theory of deserved punishment.”).
202. See Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 571,
575 (2009) (collecting sources).
203. See Ekow Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1029
(2004) (describing and rejecting this view with respect to the “three strikes” provision).
204. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 84-88 (1976);
Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591,
592 (1981).
205. See Lee, supra note 202, at 574; Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist
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literature. A number of experimental studies have found that
individuals take seriously any criminal record in setting punishment, and punishments are enhanced for recidivists.206 Although
the role of recidivism in punishment from a desert standpoint is
less important than culpability and crime seriousness,207 we should
expect it to play a role in administrative punishment if agencies are
aimed at retribution.
In contrast, the role of recidivism in punishment has presented
a challenge to the proponents of optimal deterrence.208 If the goal of
punishment is to force a wrongdoer to internalize the costs of misconduct, it is irrelevant whether the violation is the first transgression or the fifth. The harm is the same if it is imposed or threatened
by an unrepentant recidivist as if it is the result of the conduct of
a first offender.209 Indeed, because the central premise of optimal
deterrence is that violations are sometimes appropriate, repeat offenders are doing nothing more than theory assumes they will do.
Under these assumptions, incorporating recidivism in punishment
makes no more sense than a focus on mens rea.
David Dana has noted an even stronger challenge to enhancements for prior violations in systems of deterrence.210 Because many
enforcement regimes focus additional attention on those individuals
Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1135, 1135 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Jennifer Cumberland & Edward Zamble, General and Specific Measures of
Attitudes Toward Early Release of Criminal Offenders, 24 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 442, 448 (1992)
(“For both [property and violent] crime[s], the offender without a past record was consistently
seen as a better prospect for release than the recidivist criminal.”); Norman J. Finkel et al.,
Recidivism, Proportionalism, and Individualized Punishment, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 474, 481
(1996); Robert J. Gebotys & Julian V. Roberts, Public Views of Sentencing: The Role of
Offender Characteristics, 19 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 479, 485 (1987) (“The only significant
predictors of severity of assigned sentences were the seriousness of the offence and the
criminal history of the offender.”); Peter H. Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting
the Punishment to the Crime, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 59, 77 (1985) (“[The offender’s]
record of previous arrests and convictions, was fairly powerful in affecting severity
judgments.”).
207. See Darley et al., Incapacitation, supra note 26, at 659. In this study, a history of
prior offenses was used as a proxy for likelihood of recidivation, and the authors found that
this factor was less important in determining punishment severity than offense seriousness.
See id.
208. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 736 (2001).
209. See id. at 782.
210. See id. at 783.
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with a history of misconduct, enhancing penalties for those with a
history of violations undermines the central goal of optimal
deterrence by providing increasing penalties where the probability
of detection is also increased.211 Under this framework, if recidivism
should matter to punishment, it should serve as a mitigating rather
than an aggravating factor.212
A theory of complete deterrence provides a stronger justification
for considering prior history. Because complete deterrence emphasizes the goal of a complete elimination of violations,213 repeat
violations, especially repeat violations that are similar in nature,
suggest an inadequacy of past efforts at deterrence. The easiest
example to consider is the defendant with unusually large gains
from the violation. The punishment previously imposed reflected
the punisher’s best guess at the amount of punishment needed to
strip away the gain to the violator from the misconduct as enhanced
by the probability of detection.214 The repeat violation, though,
suggests that the prior guess was wrong and that the expected
benefit from the violation still exceeds the expected cost, at least for
this particular individual. As a result, increasing the punishment
to reflect this updated reality improves the chances that the
message of deterrence will be appropriately sized.
2. The Practice
Prior history plays a significant role in penalty calculation for all
four agencies. Of the four agencies, the NRC provides the most
limited consideration of prior history. For the least severe violations, those within Severity Level III, the NRC provides a penalty
reduction—as long as the violation was not willful—for entities that
have not had a violation in the previous two years that is identical
to that provided for entities that identify the problem themselves.215
211. See id.
212. See Katyal, supra note 37, at 2440 (suggesting that deterrence theory would propose
an inverse system of penalties where first offenses are punished more, rather than less,
severely).
213. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998).
214. See id.
215. See NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58, at 16.
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The NRC also points to a history of violations, particularly repeat
violations, as a reason to exercise its discretion to increase penalties.216
Similarly, OFAC implements its system of punishment for repeat
offenders by providing a reduction for first-time violators.217
Entities that have no prior OFAC violations within the previous
five years are entitled to have penalties reduced by 25 percent.218
However, like the NRC, the OFAC system does not explicitly distinguish between entities with multiple prior violations in that time
frame and those with a single violation.219
The FCC simply lists factors relating to prior history as potential
upward and downward adjustments, suggesting that penalties will
be increased for “prior violations of any FCC requirements” or
“repeated or continuous” violations, but reduced for a “history of
overall compliance.”220 Prior to abandoning its system of weighting
in favor of a more general, factor-based approach, the increases for
prior history were substantial, raising the penalty by 40 to 70
percent for a history of violations while reducing it by 20 to 50
percent for a record of overall compliance.221
Finally, MSHA has provided specific enhancements for mine
operators who have a substantial history of violations measured by
the number of violations detected per inspection day, ranging up to
twenty-five penalty points.222 The retributivist approach underlying
the MSHA penalties became particularly clear when MSHA recently substantially increased penalties for repeat violations of the
same standard:
MSHA is proposing this new provision because the Agency
believes that operators who repeatedly violate the same
standard may indicate an attitude which has little regard for
getting to the root cause of violations of safe and healthful
216. See id. at 29.
217. See Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,593, 57,599 (Nov.
9, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) (2011).
221. See 8 FCC Rcd. 6215, 6220 (1993).
222. See Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,058, 53,058-59 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100).
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working conditions. The Agency believes that these operators
show a lack of commitment to good mine safety and health
practices by letting cited and corrected hazardous conditions
recur.223

Despite its purported claim to a deterrence approach, MSHA
emphasizes here the deeply retributivist notion of culpability.
Repeat violations are taken as evidence of a more culpable mental
state.224
D. Defendant Size
1. The Theory
Agencies often vary civil penalties based on some measure of the
size of the violator, with large entities facing greater penalties than
smaller ones.225 Some scholars have taken the position that defendant wealth should be excluded entirely from the punishment
calculus when defendants are organizations and deterrence is the
goal.226 This argument rests on the assumption that organizations
are either risk neutral or, if risk averse, able to insure against
potential losses.227 As long as the defendant is risk neutral, penalties generally should not depend on the wealth of defendant,
whether the objective is cost internalization or gain stripping.228
However, defendant size can be a relevant factor if violators are
risk averse. For example, if entities and individuals are risk averse,
wealth might matter when penalties become large with respect to
the wealth of the entity being punished.229 In the administrative
223. Id. at 53,059.
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 501, app. A (2010) (varying OFAC penalties based on size of
violator); 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, ¶ 20 (1997).
226. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule
of Law: The Role of Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 420-21(1989); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
911 (1998).
227. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 226, at 886-87.
228. See id.
229. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413,
415 (1992). Alternatively, Keith Hylton has recently noted that in situations where gain or
harm is unobservable, wealth may be able to serve as a proxy if it is correlated with the
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context, the penalties imposed will generally be small compared to
the entity size and an optimal deterrence approach would suggest
that administrative agencies should be largely blind to the size of
the entity being punished.230 Furthermore, if there is reason to
believe that entities are risk averse, size should be measured in a
manner designed to reflect that risk aversion. The appropriate
measure is likely hard to determine, but perhaps net income or net
worth is the correct measure.
Defendant size might also matter for retributivists.231 As an
initial matter, size may serve as a proxy for riskiness of a violation:
misconduct by a large entity may impose a greater threat of harm
than identical conduct by a smaller entity. Additionally, we may
simply expect more from large entities, holding them to a higher
standard and, as a result, imposing greater penalties when they fall
short. Alternatively, the requirements of proportional punishment
might suggest that defendant size should matter. If larger entities
experience similar penalties differently than smaller entities, proportionality suggests that different punishments must be imposed.
The empirical desert literature supports this conclusion: mock
jurors do care a great deal about the size of the defendant when
imposing punishment.232
relevant variable of interest. See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages,
17 WIDENER L. REV. 927, 936 (2008). Hylton notes that it is unlikely that harm will both be
unmeasurable and correlated with wealth, but more frequently gain will be unmeasurable
and correlated with wealth. See id. at 940-41. Agencies, though, largely focus on harm rather
than gain, as discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 240-43.
230. Even the record civil penalties imposed on Toyota and Goldman Sachs are relatively
small compared to the size of the entities. Goldman Sachs announced $8.3 billion in net
earnings in 2010. See Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Reports Earnings Per
Common Share of $13.18 for 2010 (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/mediarelations/press-releases/current/pdfs/2010-q4-earnings.pdf. The SEC civil penalty reflected
about 6.4 percent of their earnings for the year. Similarly, the $16.4 million civil penalty
imposed on Toyota came in a year when the company announced profits of just over 408
billion yen (about $5 billion), making it less than half of one percent of earnings that year.
Compare Settlement Agreement, supra note 33, at 2, with Press Release, Toyota Motor
Corp., TMC Announce Year-End Financial Results (May 11, 2011), http://www.toyotaglobal.com/investors/financial_result/2011/pdf/q4/overview.pdf.
231. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(identifying defendant wealth as a legitimate consideration for purposes of retribution but
not deterrence); Markel, supra note 13, at 289 (arguing for considering defendant size in the
use of punitive damages as a retributive sanction).
232. See Sunstein et al., supra note 24, at 2105 n.135 (“[P]eople think in terms of
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2. The Practice
All four agencies consider entity size in setting the levels of civil
penalties. The FCC and OFAC consider entity size at a high level
of generality, identifying it as a factor that can be used to adjust
penalty levels without assigning it a specific weight. The FCC lists
“ability to pay/relative disincentive” as an upward adjustment,
whereas “inability to pay” is a consideration for a downward
adjustment.233 In describing the role of size in its penalty calculations, the FCC emphasizes two factors. First, penalties may have
different impacts on entities of different sizes. Second, the size of
the entity committing the violation is a proxy for risk and harm for
certain violations:
In particular, the identity of the licensee or the nature of the
service are not wholly irrelevant to a determination of the
seriousness of the harm. We cannot, for example, say that the
degree of harm resulting from a violation of operating power
limits committed by a full power broadcast station is identical to
the degree of harm resulting from the same violation by an
amateur radio operator. Nor can we conclude that the prospect
of a $10,000 forfeiture for a particular offense will have the
same deterrent effect on a small computer vendor, a moderatelysized radio common carrier, and a $10 billion per year local
telephone company or interexchange carrier.234

OFAC, in turn, simply states that it will look to the commercial
sophistication of the violator, the size of its operations, its financial
condition, and the volume of transactions in which it engages,
making the role of size in the agency civil penalty calculation
somewhat opaque.235

retribution rather than deterrence and that the intention to punish is an intention to inflict
pain; this means that the size of the defendant matters a good deal.”). See generally Adam
J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 196-97 (2009)
(discussing the need for both retributivists and consequentialists to consider the differential
experience of punishment for different defendants).
233. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) (2011).
234. 12 FCC Rcd. 17,087, ¶ 20 (1997).
235. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A (2011).
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MSHA provides more explicit guidance with respect to size. Mine
size plays an important role in the penalty calculation for MSHA
in two respects. First, the size of the mine itself matters, with
increasing penalty amounts for larger mines.236 Similarly, the size
of the controlling entity affects the penalty amount, albeit to a
lesser degree.237 The size of the mine itself and the size of the
controlling entity are both measured using the same metric. For
coal mines, size is measured with respect to the annual tonnage of
the mine, whereas for other mines, size is based on the number of
hours worked in the mine.238 MSHA has provided multiple justifications for the incorporation of size, some of which imply a focus on
risk aversion, although others suggest that it is a proxy for the
riskiness of the conduct.239 Of course, the tonnage of the mine and
the number of hours worked might reflect the wealth of the entity
owning the mine, but they might not. More importantly, in many
cases, information on wealth is relatively easily available. The
majority of coal in the United States is produced by mines owned by
publicly traded companies,240 which are required to produce information on both revenue and assets.
Finally, the NRC sets its base penalties based on the size of the
entity that committed the violation, ranging from $7,000 for
research, academic, medical, and other small users of nuclear
materials to $140,000 for nuclear power reactors.241 The NRC

236. See 30 C.F.R. 100.3(b) (2011).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Compare Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed.
Reg. 13,591, 13,597 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“MSHA proposed
increased points for larger operations because in order to provide an equal deterrent, the
penalties must be high for larger mines (with potentially higher revenue).”), and Criteria and
Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 47 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (May 21,
1982) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“The principal purpose of the size criterion is to aid
in assuring that the amount of the penalty is an appropriate economic incentive for future
compliance by the operator.”), with 43 Fed. Reg. 23,514, 23,515 (May 30, 1978) (“[S]ince the
primary goal of the Act is to protect worker safety and health, the critical element in
determining size should be worker exposure rather than the price of the product or the
profitability of the business.”).
240. Approximately 75 percent of coal is produced by approximately 30 percent of mines
that are publicly owned. See Fast Facts About Coal, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.nma.
org/statistics/fast_facts.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
241. NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 58, at 70 tbl.A.
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considers size primarily because misconduct by larger entities
imposes greater risk to the public: “Operations involving greater
nuclear material inventories, significantly higher consequences
resulting from a release/exposure to radioactive material, and
consequences to the public and workers receive higher civil
penalties.”242 A secondary consideration in the focus on size is “the
ability of various classes of licensees to pay the civil penalties.”243 In
an earlier policy statement, the NRC justified considering ability to
pay on the theory that “[t]he deterrent effect of civil penalties is
best served when the amounts of the penalties take into account a
licensee’s ability to pay.”244 Despite the reference to the “deterrent
effect” of civil penalties, the NRC does not appear to use risk
aversion as the primary determinant of whether civil penalties
should be increased for larger entities. Instead, the risk imposed by
misconduct involving increasingly greater quantities of nuclear
material plays the dominant role in determining penalty levels.
E. Conclusion
The civil penalty policies of these agencies are remarkably
consistent in the factors they emphasize. The agencies care deeply
about harm or the risk of harm and culpability and ignore the
probability of detection. The central emphasis on harm—to the
exclusion of gain and the probability of enforcement—eliminates the
goal of complete deterrence, and the central role of mens rea in the
penalty calculation means that it is difficult to see agencies as
engaged in optimal deterrence. Although a system of optimal
deterrence would recognize that violations are sometimes socially
beneficial, every agency is centrally focused on whether the violator
made a conscious choice to break the rules. All four agencies
emphasize deterrence as the reason for their penalty systems, yet
their actual approaches are far more consistent with a system
designed to achieve retribution.

242. Id. at 14.
243. Id.
244. See Base Civil Penalties for Loss, Abandonment, or Improper Transfer or Disposal
of Sources; Policy Statement, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,130, 79,140 (Dec. 12, 2000).
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III. IS AGENCY RETRIBUTION A REASON FOR CONCERN?
To the extent that I am correct that agencies primarily focus on
retribution, does it matter? If nothing else, this result calls into
question a common policy proposal in connection with the experimental studies on empirical desert outlined above. Some scholars
have suggested that punishment authority should be transferred to
administrative agencies based on the assumption that agencies are
more likely to emphasize deterrence than judges and juries.245 If
agencies, like individuals, are primarily interested in desert rather
than deterrence, the argument for reducing the role of juries in
punishment is substantially weaker.
Additionally, there are significant reasons to be concerned about
the agencies as retributive entities. This Part explores questions of
legitimacy and competence in agency retribution. Section A of this
Part argues that administrative agencies generally lack the
attributes that would make retributive sanctions legitimate. Section
B focuses on the question of expertise. Although agencies may be
able to claim some specialized knowledge in setting penalties aimed
at consequentialist goals, they are unlikely to have the expertise
necessary for retribution.
Thus far, I have described retributive and consequentialist
theories as conflicting approaches, reflecting alternatives that agencies might choose to pursue. However, agencies may have chosen to
focus on desert to convey a message of condemnation or norm
reinforcement.246 An important body of criminal law scholarship
argues that desert not only can serve utilitarian ends but is in fact
245. For example, Professor Sunstein proposes that the government might “shift
decisional authority away from juries and toward bureaucracies, with the knowledge that
whatever ordinary people think, the relevant administrators will seek to promote optimal
deterrence.” See Sunstein et al., supra note 116, at 250; Sunstein et al., supra note 24, at
2121 (“If optimal deterrence is the goal of punitive damages, it would probably be better for
the judgment to be made by a judge or (better still) by a specialized regulatory agency.”).
Similarly, Professor Viscusi sees the results as providing “an additional rationale for
transferring the responsibility for deterring corporate misbehavior from the courts to
regulatory agencies.” Viscusi, supra note 161, at 589.
246. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 518-19 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 593 (1996).
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the best way to do so.247 In this sense, policies that look retributive
may largely be designed to reinforce norms by punishing only those
who truly deserve it. To the extent that expressive punishment
reinforces these norms, it is better able to achieve compliance than
a cost-internalization or gain-stripping approach.248 As a result, a
retributive approach to punishment in the criminal context may be
the optimal consequentialist policy. The remainder of this Part will
consider both this possibility of norm reinforcement as the motivation for agency retribution as well as the possibility that agencies
are primarily interested in retribution for its own sake.
A. Are Agencies Legitimate Retributivists?
As an initial matter, punishment imposed by administrative
agencies lacks the hallmarks of legitimacy needed to make retribution appropriate. By its very nature, in order to make retributive
punishment legitimate, the punishment must communicate condemnation to the offender,249 which means it must have at least
two characteristics. It must be received as condemnation and it
must come from an entity authorized to communicate such a
message.250 Administrative civil penalties fulfill neither requirement.
As outlined above, administrative civil penalty policies largely
divide into two categories: those that do not disclose how penalties
are calculated and those that talk about deterrence while engaging
in retribution. Both norm reinforcement and retribution for its own
sake require transparency. In order to be legitimate, retributive
punishment has to be labeled as such. Because penalties are not
received as punishment when they are cloaked in the language of

247. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (1990); Robinson & Darley, supra note
23, at 498.
248. Any regulated community, of course, contains both individuals who honestly want to
comply with legal requirements and those who must be forced to do so. See AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 53 (“[Institutions] should be designed to protect us against
knaves while leaving space for the nurturing of civic virtue.”).
249. See, e.g., Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of
Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 910 (2010).
250. See id. at 935.
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deterrence, hidden retribution neither legitimately punishes nor
adequately reinforces norms.
The identity of the targets of regulatory enforcement raises a
further problem with administrative retribution. The vast majority
of the entities punished by administrative agencies are corporations.251 The concept of retributive punishment fits uneasily with
the corporate form. First, ascribing a mental state to a corporate
entity is a challenging task. Corporations, like all organizations, act
only through agents.252 At what level in the internal corporate
hierarchy does the mental state of the agent qualify to inculpate the
organization? Although the agency penalty schemes discussed above
are centrally focused on questions of mens rea, they largely fail to
wrestle with this central question.253 Additionally, the divided
nature of corporate ownership and control means that stockholders
bear the brunt of punishment but do not necessarily control the
decision making. For this reason, most legal scholars have focused
on deterrence, not retribution, as the most appropriate justification
for both civil and criminal punishment of corporations.254
An expressive justification provides the strongest argument for
viewing organizations as legitimate targets of desert.255 To the extent that administrative sanctions can reinforce norms by imposing
251. To be sure, agencies sometimes punish individuals. For example, the NRC has
adopted a “naming and shaming” approach to sanctions in which entities and individuals can
be identified as violators even though they are not required to pay a civil penalty. See NRC
2009 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP. 11.
252. United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991).
253. For instance, MSHA simply looks to the mental state of the corporate “mine operator”
whereas OFAC and the NRC state that they will consider whether more senior individuals
are involved in the violation. Compare Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,592, 13,611 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
100) (MSHA penalties), with NRC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 6-5 (2010) (considering the
position and regulatory responsibility of the person involved in the violation among factors
to determine the significance of a violation), and Economic Sanctions Enforcement
Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,593, 57,599 (Nov. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501)
(OFAC penalties).
254. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 246, at 517; John C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No
Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79
MICH. L. REV. 386, 448 (1981); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law:
Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1182 (1983) (collecting
sources); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477, 1494 (1996) (collecting sources).
255. See Buell, supra note 246, at 519-20.
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retributive punishments, there is no reason to reject those punishments just because they are imposed on corporations. However,
reasons exist to be very skeptical of this approach in the administrative context. In addition to the transparency problems discussed
above, the problems of vicarious liability seriously undermine the
concept of norm reinforcement. As is generically true in the criminal context, corporations are vicariously liable for the actions of
their agents when it comes to administrative enforcement.256 As a
result, sanctions may be imposed on corporations even when the
conduct occurs in violation of the stated policies of the target of
enforcement; that is, when the norm has already been accepted.257
Even scholars supporting the notion of norm reinforcement in the
context of entity liability reject a pure respondeat superior approach.258
This problem is even exacerbated by some agency practices. For
instance, MSHA is statutorily required to penalize every violation.259 Not surprisingly, this leads to a very large total number
of penalties, as well as a high dollar value for those penalties. In
2009, MSHA assessed 173,710 violations reflecting nearly $140
million in civil penalties.260 Norm reinforcement cannot justify a
system that imposes an obligation to punish in every case.261
256. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held
Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2000).
257. See id. at 1243.
258. See Buell, supra note 246, at 520.
259. Not surprisingly, the rule does not seem to be followed. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note
20, at 139 (“MSHA inspectors to whom I spoke indicated that they did not, and could not,
follow the legislative edict of nondiscretionary citation of every violation they observe.”).
260. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., NUMBER OF PENALTIES ASSESSED AND PERCENT
CONTESTED JANUARY 2007-SEPTEMBER 2011, available at http://www.msha.gov/stats/
contestedcitations/civil%20penalties%20assessed%20and%20contested.pdf.
261. Deterrence theories also would reject a duty to punish. Theories of complete and
optimal deterrence both reflect an understanding that the benefits of punishment must be
weighed against the costs. When the costs of punishment outweigh those benefits, deterrence
theorists recognize that the punishment should not be imposed. In a system in which the
relative costs of imposing punishment are high, as is the case with MSHA, a mandatory
punishment regime is even harder to explain from a deterrence standpoint. For example, 27
percent of the violations, reflecting about two-thirds of the penalties, were contested by the
target mine in calendar year 2009. Id. MSHA is not alone in the mandatory punishment
category. “Several courts of appeals have read [the Clean Water Act] to require that a civil
penalty must be imposed in every case in which a court has found a Clean Water Act
violation.” United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir.
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Punishing every violation, no matter how minor, dilutes the expressive effect of punishment and undermines the norm that such
a system tries to achieve.262
The second major legitimacy concern with the retributive use of
administrative penalties is procedural.263 Because administrative
penalties are “civil”264 in nature, they escape the wide range of
constitutional provisions protecting the rights of criminal defendants.265 The protections provide legitimacy to the process of retribution. The Supreme Court largely defers to the initial legislative
designation of the penalty as civil or criminal.266 With respect to
2010).
262. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert,
76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1996). In contrast, at least some retributive theories can be
consistent with a mandatory duty to punish. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797); Michael T. Cahill,
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 828 (2007) (outlining various
retributive theories, including an affirmative duty to punish).
263. See TYLER, supra note 23, at 162.
264. The line between the civil and criminal law is foundational, see, e.g., Issachar RosenZvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 80-81 & n.3 (2008)
(collecting citations), but controversial, with the controversy growing as the line has blurred.
See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991); Linda Eads, Separating Crime from Punishment: The
Constitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 931 (1990);
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94
GEO. L.J. 1, 3, 4 n.6 (2005) (citing articles); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Civil-Criminal
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 691 (1999). Civil money penalties clearly fall close to
the dividing line. Compare United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (holding civil
penalties are punishment for double jeopardy purposes), with Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 101-02 (1997) (overruling Halper). See also Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for
Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478,
480 (1973); Fellmeth, supra, at 4.
265. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (Ex Post Facto Clause); Hudson, 522 U.S.
at 98-99 (Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (Fifth
Amendment).
266. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); Ward, 448
U.S. at 248. This approach has been heavily criticized with a range of countertheories
offered, suggesting that the punitiveness of the scheme should be either more important in
drawing the civil-criminal distinction, i.e., courts should provide little or no deference to the
legislative label, see Fellmeth, supra note 264, at 42, or it should be less important, and
deference should be close to complete, see Cheh, supra note 264, at 1389. In contrast,
Professor Steiker argues for a redefinition of punishment, placing the notion of blame at the
center of the divide. See Carol S. Steiker, Forward to Punishment and Procedure:
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedure Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 809 (1997).
Other scholars have suggested abandoning the rigid line and recognizing that all penalties
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monetary penalties imposed by administrative agencies, Congress
has clearly spoken by naming them “civil,”267 but such penalties can
still cross the line if they are “so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate” their designation as civil.268
This test requires the Court to define “punishment,” a task with
which it has struggled, but the motivation behind the penalty plays
an important role.269 On one side are policies that are remedial in
nature. If the government imposes a civil penalty to seek compensation for an injury to itself as victim, that penalty is far less likely to
be seen as punitive.270 On the other side are penalties that are
retributive, “punishment” in the most traditional definition.
Retribution for past wrongs is classically criminal, rather than civil,
in nature.271 Deterrence has been more difficult to classify.272
are inherently hybrids of the civil and criminal law, requiring the development of a
“middleground” procedural approach, see, e.g., Klein, supra note 264, at 720; Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanction: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J.
1795, 1799 (1992), or reformulating the question in terms of other, more relevant functional
distinctions to the procedural questions at issue, see Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 264, at
84-85 (looking at the balance of power between the parties and the severity of the sanction).
267. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103.
268. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
269. The Court has often looked toward the multipart test from Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), which requires courts to consider whether the penalty
involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. The Mendoza-Martinez test suffers from the flaw of all such multipart tests—the
difficulty of determining the outcome when the factors point in different directions. See
Fellmeth, supra note 264, at 36; Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 264, at 126.
270. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972); Charney, supra note 264, at 497-500 (collecting cases).
271. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 102; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62; Charney, supra note 264,
at 509 (“Because retribution is the essence of the criminal action, any loss inflicted on that
basis must be classified as a criminal sanction.”); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal
Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379,
406-07 (1976).
272. In the seminal but relatively short-lived opinion in United States v. Halper, the Court
placed deterrence with retribution as a form of punishment. 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). When
the Court retreated in Hudson, civil money penalties moved back across the civil/criminal
line and took the deterrence motivation with them. The Hudson Court noted that money
penalties will deter, but the “mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a
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Although the Court has vacillated, it currently accepts the notion
that deterrence as a motivation does not make a penalty scheme
suspect, whereas retributive aims may raise constitutional questions.273
The Supreme Court, though, has refused to look past the
legislative designation of the purpose of the punishment to consider
how the penalty is applied in practice. In Hudson v. United States,
the Court recognized that the amount of the civil penalty in that
case depended on the mental state of the violator, but it relied on
the fact that the statute did not include scienter as an element.274 In
Seling v. Young, the Court held that the punitiveness of a penalty
scheme does not depend on its application; the statute had to be
analyzed for punitive intent and effect on its face.275 The Seling
Court refused to look at the application of the scheme largely
because it viewed the task as too difficult. It saw the analysis of the
punitiveness of the scheme as “unworkable”276 and refused to subject the civil nature of the scheme to the “vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute.”277
Even though the Supreme Court has been unwilling to look into
the details of agency punishment schemes, this case law at least
should raise concerns about administrative penalties aimed toward
retribution. Because the central procedural protections available in
the criminal context are absent on the civil side, there is reason to
doubt that administrative penalties can achieve the level of legitimacy available for criminal punishment.

sanction criminal, as deterrence ‘may serve civil as well as criminal goals.’” 522 U.S. at 105
(quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)). The debate over where to place
deterrence as a motive in the context of civil penalties did not start with Halper. See Mann,
supra note 266, at 1830 (dating attempts to separate deterrence and retribution back to
1909).
273. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
274. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (“‘Good faith’ is considered by OCC in determining the
amount of the penalty to be imposed ... but a penalty can be imposed even in the absence of
bad faith. The fact that petitioners’ ‘good faith’ was considered in determining the amount
of the penalty to be imposed in this case is irrelevant, as we look only to ‘the statute on its
face’ to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature.”).
275. 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001).
276. Id. at 263.
277. Id.
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B. Are Agencies Capable Retributivists?
There is a second significant problem with agency retribution.
Agencies might not be very good at it. The Supreme Court has
assumed that agencies are experts in their area of enforcement.
When agencies sanction, their discretion “is at its zenith,”278 and
penalties are “not to be overturned unless ... ‘unwarranted in law
or ... without justification in fact.’”279 As is true in many areas of
administrative law, courts justify this deference to agency judgment
in setting penalties in terms of the relative expertise of agencies.280
Notably, courts presume that agencies have a specialized understanding of the types of sanctions likely to achieve compliance.281
If, in fact, agencies do primarily impose penalties for purposes of
retribution, this assumption is dubious. Agencies are unlikely to be
able to claim any particular expertise in the allocation of desertbased punishment. Here it is useful to return to the distinction
between normative and empirical desert. If desert is derived from
reasoned considerations of the implications of philosophical
principles, agencies can hardly be seen as experts on the subject.
278. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 462 F.3d 1027, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
279. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973) (quoting Am.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1946)). In Butz, the Supreme Court faced a
challenge to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend a seller of livestock for
a regulatory violation. See id. at 183. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals decision
overturning the suspension, refusing to even impose a requirement of consistency on
administrative agencies and stating that sanctions are not invalid because they are imposed
unevenly. See id. at 187-88. Although the sanction in Butz was suspension, the strongly
deferential standard of review also applies when the sanction is a civil money penalty. See
Modern Cont’l Constr. Co. v. OSHA, 305 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2002); Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d
1301, 1309 (7th Cir. 1994).
280. “[T]he relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative
competence.” Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 112 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).
281. The Butz Court, for instance, took for granted that deterrence was the goal of the
Secretary of Agriculture in setting penalties, noting that his practice “apparently is to employ
[the sanction of suspension] as in his judgment best serves to deter violations and achieve
the objectives of that statute.” Butz, 411 U.S. at 187-88; see also, e.g., Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d
157, 160-61 (1st Cir. 2000); Cnty. Produce, Inc. v. USDA, 103 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“We must defer to the agency’s judgment as to the appropriate sanctions for PACA
violations.... The USDA is particularly familiar with the problems inherent in the produce
industry, and it has experience conforming the behavior of produce companies to the
requirements of PACA.”).
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On the other hand, agencies may be capable of applying theories of
empirical desert.282 Indeed, the central argument outlined above is
that agencies, either consciously or inadvertently, are doing exactly
that.
There is no reason, though, to think that administrative agencies
have an unusual capacity to impose such punishments. Compare
agencies to the two natural alternatives: civil juries and district
judges. Juries are well placed to take an approach of empirical
desert. If the goal of punishment is to reflect community desires, lay
jurors have a far better claim of expertise on that subject than
administrative agencies. Similarly, federal district judges routinely
impose retributive penalties in the course of criminal sentencing.283
Both of these institutional actors seem more likely to reflect the
goals of empirical desert more accurately than agencies.
Furthermore, using desert to reinforce norms faces serious
implementation problems in the administrative context. The arguments that justify desert as a utilitarian approach in criminal law
are much weaker when applied to administrative civil penalties.
Two important characteristics of the criminal law are largely absent
in the administrative context—norms are weaker and the goals of
punishment are less transparent. As an initial matter, arguments
about the consequentialist value of desert generally assume a preexisting set of norms.284 These norms classify conduct as either
acceptable or unacceptable regardless of the existence of punishment.285 Criminal punishment can then respond to these preexisting
norms in several important ways. First, by focusing criminal punishment on conduct that already violated these norms, law enforcement leverages the preexisting stigmatizing effect of norm violation
to more cheaply obtain compliance.286 Second, the criminal law
reinforces these norms by serving as the legitimate institution that

282. See supra Part I.B.
283. District judges are statutorily required to consider retribution when sentencing
defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2011); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
367 (1989) (Sentencing Reform Act “states that punishment should serve retributive,
educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals”).
284. See PAUL ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 96-97, 175-76 (2008).
285. See id. at 176.
286. See id.
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punishes their violation.287 Finally, the criminal law can extend the
boundaries of these norms by establishing its legitimacy in
situations in which norms are clear.288 By gaining a reputation for
fairness in the easy cases by reinforcing preexisting norms, the
criminal law can set norms in the borderline cases.289
If administrative civil penalties are aimed at norm reinforcement,
the task is far more difficult because the norms do not necessarily
exist prior to agency action. The problem is clearest in the context
of safety regulatory agencies. Both MSHA and the NRC regulate
highly dangerous conduct by drawing lines based both on the
riskiness of the conduct and the cost of further safety measures.290
The line dividing acceptable behavior (conduct that is sufficiently
safe given the cost of additional preventative measure) and
unacceptable conduct (behavior where additional safety measures
should be mandated given their cost) is hard to draw and is, in
many ways, inherently arbitrary. Entities that are regulated by
these agencies learn the acceptability of conduct by looking at the
rules themselves rather than drawing on a preexisting body of
societal norms. Agencies are thus forced to take on the difficult task
of norm setting rather than the comparatively easier task of norm
reinforcement.
CONCLUSION
The presence of retribution in agency punishment provides an
important data point on the plausibility of placing deterrence at the
center of any punishment scheme. Administrative agencies are
perhaps better situated than any other actors to impose penalties
in a manner consistent with the law and economics literature. For
example, practicality objections are an important reason that
287. See id. at 186.
288. See id. at 187.
289. See 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A) (2000) (identifying “the feasibility of the standards” as
a consideration when developing mandatory mining safety and health standards); Kevin
Clancy, Note, Unresolved Safety Issues in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: Reasonable
Assurance of Safety or Nuclear Shell Game?, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 101 (1980) (stating
that NRC regulations “reflect the NRC’s assessment of acceptable cost in light of the
expected benefit and risk involved”).
290. See id.
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deterrence has taken a back seat to retribution in other areas of
punishment. Scholars have advocated for both cost-internalization291 and gain-stripping approaches to punitive damages.292
This effort to bring an economic approach to punitive damages has
not been entirely unsuccessful,293 but it has generally fallen short.294
Similarly, attempts to emphasize deterrence over retribution in
the criminal law also have a long history, but not a long history of
success. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century reform
movements tried to refocus the purposes of punishment on consequentialist goals.295 The Model Penal Code (MPC) represented
perhaps the high point of this movement.296 Many states, most
famously Minnesota, followed the MPC statement of purpose297 with
statutory statements of purpose that set aside retribution as a goal
in favor of consequentialist objectives.298 Retribution, though, would
not go quietly. Sentencing reforms in the 1970s and 1980s brought

291. Several scholars have advocated for multiplying compensatory damages by the
reciprocal of the probability of detection. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive
Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH L.
REV. 774, 799-800 (2010); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 226, at 874-75. Catherine Sharkey
offers an expanded view of the role of punitive damages in cost internalization. See Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 401 (2003).
292. See Hylton, supra note 213, at 423 (arguing for a complete deterrence approach). On
the other side, other scholars have assigned nonconsequential purposes to punitive damages.
See, e.g., Markel, supra note 13, at 245 (describing punitive damages as intermediate
retributive sanction); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 957, 961 (2007) (describing punitive damages as state-sanctioned revenge); Benjamin
C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 139 (2005) (describing
punitive damages as victim vindication).
293. See Sharkey, supra note 291, at 372 & n.71 (collecting cases).
294. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001)
(recognizing broader justifications for punitive damages than optimal deterrence).
295. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
1-6 (2003) (outlining history).
296. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1319-20 (2000);
George P. Fletcher, Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 649, 655 (1988).
297. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (1962) (providing general purposes of punishment).
298. See Cotton, supra note 296, at 1325-26.
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retribution back,299 and academics and legislatures have increasingly revitalized it as the dominant reason for punishment.300
Deterrence has struggled to gain traction for a variety of reasons,
but a key component is the real-world difficulty of the approach.
Traditional deterrence theories make strong assumptions about
how both law enforcement and violators behave, and these assumptions are frequently not true in practice. Although these assumptions fail in the administrative context as well, they are far closer
to being true. For instance, deterrence theory assumes that decisions about the level of punishment and the probability of
detection are made jointly and simultaneously.301 In traditional
criminal enforcement, law enforcement sets the probability of
detection for violations, whereas a sentencing judge sets the level
of punishment. Administrative agencies are different. Because of
the blend between executive, legislative, and judicial roles in the
administrative context, agencies oversee their inspection and
enforcement functions, issue rules establishing systems of penalty
guidelines, and decide penalties in individual cases. They therefore
control both the probability of detection and the eventual punishment. Because agencies can control all aspects of enforcement, they

299. See Huigens, supra note 154, at 980 n.152 (noting “retributivism’s resurgence in the
1970s”).
300. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845-47 (2002) (collecting sources). The more specific and
limited efforts to explicitly calculate punishment on approaches based on optimal or complete
deterrence have also foundered. Most significantly, initial proposals for the United States
Sentencing Guidelines for organizational defendants would have focused on theories of
deterrence. For example, there were proposals to explicitly consider the probability of
detection as a central component of setting punishment levels for organizations. See Ilene
H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations:
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 219-20 (1993) (discussing the consideration of the probability of detection
in setting organizational penalties); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for
Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 516
(1989) (proposing a system of optimal deterrence for punishment of organizations). The
proposal, though, was ultimately abandoned because, among other reasons, the calculation
of the probability of detection was thought to be unworkable. Nagel & Swenson, supra, at
219-20.
301. Traditional law enforcement may face even more serious difficulties than the
argument in the text outlines because, to the extent that police focus on crimes with the
longest sentences, punishment may be positively rather than negatively correlated with the
probability of detection. See Katyal, supra note 37, at 2411.
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have a much greater opportunity to establish a deterrence-based
system if they so choose.
Similarly, the information problems in administrative enforcement are far smaller. In the traditional criminal context, the
assumption of perfect information by defendants and enforcers is a
dubious one.302 Violators are unlikely to be aware of the situations
under which fines might be imposed and what those fines are. In
contrast, in the civil regulatory environment, regulated entities not
only have counsel, but they are also repeat players in the regulation
game. They have the opportunity to observe the rules as they
develop. On the other side, administrative agencies have one of the
most important factors available in the implementation of a model
based on the probability of detection: the capacity to generate the
necessary data. A central weakness of traditional theories of
deterrence is that enforcement often lacks the ability to determine
how frequently violators escape the consequences of misconduct.303
Those problems are substantially reduced in the administrative
context because administrative agencies face a much easier
problem. The universe of potential violators is much smaller
because it is restricted to the regulated entities, and in many cases
agencies have the power to audit.304 An administrative agency
could, for example, vary its routine audits with less frequent audits
that are either more intensive or focused on particular violations.
Comparing the rate of detection of violations in these two different
approaches would allow the agency to estimate a baseline probability of detection.305

302. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 37, at 954 (describing information problems in
traditional deterrence theory).
303. See Jonathan S. Feinstein, Detection Controlled Estimation, 33 J.L. ECON. 233, 233
(1990).
304. MSHA not only can inspect mines regularly but is statutorily required to inspect
every underground mine four times per year and every above-ground mine twice a year.
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2006). These inspections
produce a wealth of data on the mining industry, the nature and types of violations that
mines commit, and the penalties imposed on mines that violate the rules. See Morantz, supra
note 42, at 56-58 (outlining the types of data available on mine safety). The NRC has similar
audit powers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1029, OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT SAFETY HAS IMPROVED, BUT REFINEMENTS ARE NEEDED (2006).
305. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 303, at 239-40, 265-69 (outlining statistical techniques
to model the probability that violations go undetected).
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Of course, an argument that administrative agencies are more
able to implement a deterrence-based approach to punishment than
other enforcement entities does not demonstrate that it is possible.
Even with the advantages agencies have over traditional law
enforcement entities, optimal or complete deterrence might be out
of reach. If that is true, though, we should be skeptical of any
system of punishment that claims to be designed to achieve
deterrence rather than retribution.

